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Updating the EU Internal Market Concept 
 
Ioannis Lianos1 
 
Abstract 
 
The study analyses the EU Internal market from a dynamic and a contextual 
perspective, taking into account, not just the normative changes brought by the intense 
legislative and judicial activity in this area, but also the important economic and technological 
transformations that have largely altered the structure of the global economy in the last two to 
three decades. These could, in my view, challenge the first principles upon which the EU 
economic integration process and, in particular the “single market” idea, is based. This 
“updating” of the Internal market project is essential if one is to critically reflect on the role 
and the specificity of the EU integration process, in the context of the broader globalization 
movement. The first part of the paper introduces the “neo-functionalist” perspective, which 
has largely influenced the EU economic integration process, from its incipiency, and explores 
its theoretical linkages with trade theory (the law of one price), thus presenting the fundamental 
tenets of positive EU Internal market law. The second part delves into the subsequent mutation 
of the economic integration ideal towards the more modular and scalar concept of “regulatory 
convergence”. Opening the black box of economic integration will lead us to analyse its 
transformation, as a result of a paradigm shift currently occurring in the organization of the 
global process of economic production, with the development of global value chains, and the 
important role of technology, in particular the Internet, in promoting economic integration not 
through law, but through code. The study predicts that addressing more systematically the 
effect of both private and public obstacles to trade should take centre-stage if one is to opt for 
a more holistic and dynamic perspective in analysing the process of economic integration. A 
more extensive intervention of the competition law tool and other regulatory initiatives against 
private restrictions to trade is therefore to be expected in the future, these areas of law taking 
a more prevalent part in the EU Internal market law compass. The study discusses in some 
detail the recent legislative and jurisprudential developments with regard to geo-blocking and 
geo-filtering practices. The last part of the study provides some concluding thoughts on the 
need for the EU Internal market concept to be updated and raises some questions with regard 
to its ontology in the context of a globalized economy. 
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I. Introduction 
 
During the six decades of the European Union (EU) integration projection, the ambition 
of establishing a “single market” has provided focus, a strong technocratic drive, and a clear 
sense of direction to the battling project of European integration, as it has been traveling a 
bumpy road marked by numerous blockages and stalemates. Achieving and perfecting the 
Internal market project has been the steady and unmovable aim providing the necessary sense 
of direction and purpose that has often helped to diffuse the political tension and transform in 
positive energy the accumulated steam resulting from the various political, economic and social 
frictions to which the EU has been confronted since its inception. The mechanics of this 
dynamic of integration seem to have incurred various malfunctions in recent years, and it is 
still unclear if the efforts made to reignite the spark will bring the expected results2. The 
difficulties incurred by the integration process notwithstanding, the European Internal market 
is largely considered as a success story, both from a legal and from an economic perspective3.  
Generations of students have been introduced to the intricacies of EU law through the 
careful consideration of the intersection of, and balance between, the principles of EU 
harmonization and national policy autonomy. The Internal Market has frequently been the 
focus of this academic literature, in particular the application of the negative integration rules 
of the Treaty on the free movement of goods and the definition of the concept of Measures 
Equivalent to a Quantitative Restriction (MEQR). This literature has often focused on the 
hermeneutics of the most emblematical judgments for the implementation of Article 34 TFEU, 
Dassonville, Cassis de Dijon, and Keck and Mithouard, which, but for the latter one, have 
established the sequence of analysis that the CJEU has applied to all four freedoms. Another 
strand of literature has focused on the intricacies of the positive integration process and the 
limits of legislative harmonization, as this has evolved through the use of Article 114 TFEU 
by the EU legislators, the latter provision enabling EU harmonisation in furtherance of the 
internal market. 
The study does not aim to revisit these issues, which have been widely commented on 
by a great number of excellent EU law scholars4. My objective is instead to analyse the Internal 
market from a dynamic and a contextual perspective, taking into account, not just the normative 
changes brought by the intense legislative and judicial activity, but also the important economic 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, European Commission, White paper on the Future of Europe - Reflections and scenarios  for 
the EU27 by 2025 (March 2017); Emmanuel Macron, Initiative pour l’Europe ( September 26, 2017), available 
at http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-
europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/ . 
3 See, the most recent “Single market scoreboard” for 2017, assessing the performance of EU Member States in 
implementing the Single market objectives http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/ . On the economic 
impact see, inter alia, the literature review by J. Pelkmans, European Union Single Market: economic impact, in 
S.N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (Palgrave, Online Edition, 2011); B. 
Eichengreen, & A. Boltho, The economic impact of European integration, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6820, 
(May 2008). 
4 See, for instance, most recently, the excellent monographs published by S. Weatherill, The Internal Market as a 
Legal Concept (OUP, 2017) and R. Schütze, From International to Federal Market – The Changing Structure of 
European Law (OUP, 2017), and the collective volume published by P. Koutrakos & J. Snell (eds.), Research 
Handbook on the Law of the EU’s Internal Market (Edward Elgar, 2017)  
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and technological transformations that have largely altered the structure of the global economy 
in the last two to three decades. These could, in my view, challenge the first principles upon 
which the EU economic integration process and, in particular the “single market” idea, is based. 
This updating of the Internal market project is essential if one is to critically reflect on role and 
the specificity of the EU integration process, in the context of the broader globalization 
movement. 
The study analyses the EU Internal market from a dynamic and a contextual 
perspective, taking into account, not just the normative changes brought by the intense 
legislative and judicial activity in this area, but also the important economic and technological 
transformations that have largely altered the structure of the global economy in the last two to 
three decades. These could, in my view, challenge the first principles upon which the EU 
economic integration process and, in particular the “single market” idea, is based. This 
“updating” of the Internal market project is essential if one is to critically reflect on the role 
and the specificity of the EU integration process, in the context of the broader globalization 
movement. The first part introduces the “neo-functionalist” perspective, which has largely 
influenced the EU economic integration process, from its incipiency, and explores its 
theoretical linkages with trade theory (the law of one price), thus presenting the fundamental 
tenets of positive EU Internal market law. The second part delves into the subsequent mutation 
of the economic integration ideal towards the more modular and scalar concept of “regulatory 
convergence”. Opening the black box of economic integration will lead us to analyse its 
transformation, as a result of a paradigm shift currently occurring in the organization of the 
global process of economic production, with the development of global value chains, and the 
important role of technology, in particular the Internet, in promoting economic integration not 
through law, but through code. The study predicts that addressing more systematically the 
effect of both private and public obstacles to trade should take centre-stage if one is to opt for 
a more holistic and dynamic perspective in analysing the process of economic integration. A 
more extensive intervention of the competition law tool and other regulatory initiatives against 
private restrictions to trade is therefore to be expected in the future, these areas of law taking a 
more prevalent part in the EU Internal market law compass. The study discusses in some detail 
the recent legislative and jurisprudential developments with regard to geo-blocking and geo-
filtering practices. The last part of the study provides some concluding thoughts on the need 
for the Internal market concept to be updated and raises some questions with regard to its 
ontology in the context of a globalized economy. 
 
II. The neo-functionalist dream of “economic integration” meets international 
trade theory: the law of one price and the rise of the EU Internal market 
concept  
 
The emergence of the concept of “integration”, owes a lot to functionalist theories, 
which were the first to break away “from the traditional link between authority and a definite 
territory”, as it was until then theorised in international law (territoriality), “by ascribing 
authority to activities based in areas of agreement” between States5. States exercise several 
                                                 
5 W. Mattli, The Logic Of Regional Integration – Europe and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 21. 
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functions (activities), some of which require action at the international level. This transfer 
initiates the process of integration, which is driven by the continuous pursuit of these functions, 
in the context of an international institution created to that effect. According to functionalism, 
“(e)very function is left to generate others gradually; in every case the appropriate authority is 
left to grow and develop out of actual performance”6. Based on this approach, neo-
functionalism was able to construct a theory of regional integration, for which the model of 
European integration became the archetypical example. The functionalist approach and the 
concept of integration are profoundly interlinked: without the functionalist emphasis on the 
existence of separate functions, where authority can be transferred, there can be no talk of 
integration.  
The concept of “economic integration” has been a central element of post-war economic 
thinking over trade and international economic relations7. The concept suffered from an 
“abundance of mutually contradictory definitions”8, perhaps because of its dual essence: 
integration can be conceived of as a process, encompassing “measures designed to abolish 
discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states”, as well as a state 
of affairs, represented by “the absence of various forms of discrimination between national 
economies”9. Its meaning has been framed by the tensions between the “liberalist” (market 
friendly) and the dirigist (state intervention friendly) ideals that characterized the political 
landscape of the post-war era10.  
The development of the twin concepts of negative and positive integration, coined by 
Tinbergen in 196511, and seen as complementary tools to remove discrimination and 
restrictions of movement to enable the market to function effectively, while promoting other 
broader policy objectives, was seen as a necessary compromise to make “economic integration” 
acceptable to both camps. The different “stages of integration” identified by Balassa12, as well 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 21-22 referring to the work of D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Quadrangle Books: Chicago, 
1966). 
7 On the emergence of the theory of international economic integration see, F. Machlup, A History of Thought on 
Economic Integration, (Macmillan Press, 1977), noting that the term was first employed in business economics. 
Economists in the inter-war era employed the negative noun of ‘disintegration’ of the world economy, probably 
as a consequence of the national protectionist legislation that followed the economic crisis of 1929. The positive 
noun of ‘integration’ was first employed after the Second World War in order to provide a conceptual vehicle for 
the efforts of ‘‘integration of the Western European economy’ the substance of which ‘‘would be the formation 
of a single large market within which quantitative restrictions on the movements of goods, monetary barriers to 
the flow of payments and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away’ F. Machlup (above, p. 11) referring 
to Paul Hoffmann’s official pronouncement to the Council of the Organisation of European Economic Co-
operation on 31 October 1949. 
8 F. Machlup, A History of Thought on Economic Integration, (Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 13. 
9 B.. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), p. 1. For a less extended 
analysis, see B. Balassa, Towards a Theory of Economic Integration, (1961) 14(1) Kyklos 1, 17. For a more 
‘outcome-oriented’ definition see, J.Tinbergen, International Economic Integration (Elsevier, 1954), p. 95, 
defining integration as ‘the creation of the most desirable structure of international economy, removing artificial 
hindrances to the optimal operation and introducing deliberately all desirable elements of co-ordination or 
unification’. 
10 F. Machlup, A History of Thought on Economic Integration, (Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 7-10. 
11 J. Tinbergen, International Economic Integration (Elsevier, 1965), p. 76-77. See also J. Pinder, Positive 
Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the EEC, (1968) 24 World Today 
88-110.  
12 B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, 1st ed. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), p. 2. 
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as his distinguishing the concepts of “integration” from that of “cooperation”13, were also 
inspired by the same narrative of removing barriers and achieving regulatory sameness, to the 
point that they attracted the criticism that their final stage, the unitary state, was 
“misconceived” for being inspired “by a centralist rather than federal state model”14. Despite 
the absence of an authoritative definition of the term, Fritz Machlup noted in 1977 that a wide 
consensus existed as to the three essential conditions for economic integration: “economic 
integration refers basically to division of labour”, “it involves mobility of goods or factors”, “it 
is related to discrimination or non-discrimination in the treatment of goods and factors”15. 
Profoundly linked to international trade theory, the aim of economic integration may be 
conceived more broadly, as the constitution of a single market, or more narrowly, as the 
removal of customs duties and regulatory trade barriers.  
The broad conception of economic integration is associated with “the law of one price”, as 
stated in the neoclassical economics of perfect competition, which determines the boundaries 
of a (single) market according to the ability of arbitrageurs to purchase the asset in the cheaper 
market and sell it where prices are higher. Simply put, where there is one price there is one 
market.  As Alfred Marshall explained, “the more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger the 
tendency for the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in all parts of the 
market”16. This theoretical model depends on a number of assumptions, including perfect 
knowledge of any price differential among countries, which could give rise to the possibility 
of arbitrage. It also should be qualified to account for transport costs, which limit the 
possibilities of profitable arbitrage, although these have been greatly reduced in recent years 
following technological progress in the means of transportation, such as containerization, 
which limited shipping costs, and the development of refrigeration technologies and modern 
logistics. The main idea behind the model is that in a “single” market prices tend to converge17. 
If one follows this approach, the size of a (single) market depends on transportation costs, 
information on trade opportunities by the arbitrageurs, and the specific characteristics of the 
various segments of the market, or sub-markets. Such characteristics include differences in 
tastes in private and public goods, available revenues, different occupations, governmental 
barriers to the transport and trade of outputs and inputs, or to the dissemination of knowledge18.  
One should not however only focus on the demand side, but should also look to the supply 
side. Charles Kindleberger has put forward the idea that economic integration essentially means 
factor price equalization achieved by direct trading on one market19. Various forms of 
“economic integration” lead to different degrees of factor price equalization between the 
                                                 
13 B. Balassa, Towards a Theory of Economic Integration, (1961) 14(1) Kyklos 1, 4-5, indicating that ‘(w)hereas 
cooperation includes various measures designed to harmonize economic policies and to lessen discrimination, the 
process of economic integration comprises those measures which entail the suppression of some forms of 
discrimination’. See also the transformation of the title of Jan Tinbergen’s work to International Economic 
Integration (in 1954) from International Economic Co-operation (1945). 
14 J. Pelkmans, European Integration. Methods and Economic Analysis 3th ed. (OUP, 2006), 8-9. 
15 F. Machlup, A History of Thought on Economic Integration, (Macmillan Press, 1977), 14. 
16 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics: An  Introductory Volume, (Macmillan, 9th ed., 1952), 325. 
17 On the history of the development of the law of One Price in Economics, see C. P. Kindleberger, Economic 
Laws and Economic History (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), fourth lecture. 
18 Ibid., p. 67. 
19 Ibid., p. 68. 
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countries that chose to constitute a single market. At one side of the economic integration 
continuum, a Customs Union involves the free circulation of products (goods and services), 
eventually leading to some form of price convergence at the demand side for these products, 
while at the other side of the continuum Economic and Monetary integration implies that both 
the capital and labour factors of production are free to move between countries, thus leading, 
at least theoretically, to some convergence in the factor prices (e.g. wages). One would need 
also to take into account the factor quality and the total factor productivity before arriving to 
any definite conclusions20. This factor price equalization is reached by the movement of factors 
of production, by the movement of goods, or by both of them.  
A broader conception of economic integration would indeed aim to accelerate factor-price 
equalization across the EU, to the extent this is of course possible, assuming away “natural” 
barriers to trade, such as transport costs and climate. Having such a conception of economic 
integration inevitably leads to an extensive role for integration through law, both of the positive 
and negative kind, but also integration through the development of common social norms in 
the countries in question, so that some convergence emerges in each society’s tastes in private 
and public goods. The measurement of economic integration may take the form in this context 
of assessing price differentials between the various regions/countries that are supposed to 
become a single market21. Such an approach may be unachievable and normatively undesirable, 
if the project of economic integration is not aiming to reduce differences in tastes and in cultural 
traditions, as this becomes clear by the chosen Motto of the EU, In varietate concordia (united 
in diversity), and the prevalent ideal of the legal pluralism of the EU legal order22.  
The narrow perspective on economic integration only focuses on the removal of government 
barriers to trade without paying specific attention to eventual price differentials across the EU 
or across-EU member States with regard to factor of production prices. Only governmental 
legal barriers to trade should be removed, to the extent that these result from disparities in 
regulation/legislation, as opposed to removing barriers to trade resulting from different social 
norms. These barriers may first take the form of customs duties and tariffs, which have been 
abolished since July 1968 between member States of the EU, in relation to the trade of all goods 
following the entry into force of the customs union. The abolition of all customs duties and, in 
1993, of customs controls at internal borders of the EU, certainly went beyond the economic 
integration that the GATT system achieved at the global scale. Tariffs were substantially 
lowered in the first GATT round in 1947, then again with the Kennedy round in 1963-1967, 
before another significant reduction with the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). They may also take 
                                                 
20 According to the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory: P. Samuelson, International Trade and 
the Equalization of Factor Prices, (1948) 58 Economic Journal 163-184; P. Samuelson, International Factor Price 
Equalization Once Again, (1949) 59 Economic Journal 181-196. 
21 For a possible example of such measurement, see the Report on car prices within the European Union that the 
European Commission has published annually between 1993 and 2011, which took into account the consumer 
prices (both including and excluding taxes) of various brands and models of cars across the EU. The publication 
of this report was discontinued in 2011. This report only focused on the prices of the product, here the various 
brands of cars, and did not include information on factor price equalization. See, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/motor_vehicles/prices/archive.html . 
22 On this concept, see, inter alia, N.W. Barber, Legal Pluralism and the European Union, (2006) 12(3) European 
Law Journal 306. 
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the form of non-tariff barriers to trade. Public authorities began addressing such barriers in the 
context of the international trade negotiations for the GATT at the Tokyo Round, starting in 
1973, which constituted the first major attempt in the context of the GATT to tackle non-tariff 
barriers to trade. The equivalent step in the process of EU economic integration was ignited by 
the intervention of the Commission in 197023, followed by the judgment of the CJEU in 
Dassonville24 and culminating with the Cassis de Dijon case law a few years later25.  
The dilemma at this moment was if the negative integration clauses of the EU Treaty 
concerning the free movement of goods should have extended to cover discriminatory (directly 
or indirectly), as well as non-discriminatory barriers to trade (or indistinctly applicable barriers 
to trade). Choosing the former approach offered more leeway and discretion to the Member 
States to regulate their economy, with the aim of satisfying the preferences of their citizens, as 
only regulation leading to some form of discrimination in law or in fact could fall under the 
prohibition of the EU Treaties on Measures Equivalent to a Quantitative Restriction 
(hereinafter MEQR). Choosing the non-discriminatory path may have brought within the scope 
of the prohibition of MEQR indistinctly applicable measures simply because they imposed 
additional costs for the specific product to reach the consumers of the host country. The 
prohibition would apply to the extent that the obstacle to trade was not justified by means of 
mandatory (or imperative) requirements in the general interest applied in a proportionate 
manner, i.e., appropriate, necessary and reflecting the (lack of) equivalence of the regulatory 
framework in place in the country of origin26.  
The approach of the CJEU was based on the principle of mutual recognition, which may not 
accommodate a pure application of the law of one price, as some form of regulatory divergence 
is permitted, if the public interest in question is not protected by the regulation of the country 
of origin, and the regulation of the host State satisfies the proportionality test27. However, it is 
also clear that shifting the burden to prove the absence of a MEEQR to the host Member State, 
requiring it to put forward mandatory requirements of general interest and to establish that they 
lead to a “proportional” restriction of trade, may potentially exercise some deregulatory effect. 
More importantly, for some authors, the Cassis de Dijon case law marks the rite of passage of 
EU Internal market law from an international market with a law that is intrinsically linked to 
the international economic law approach28, to the establishment of a federal market, where 
States lose “a part of their internal sovereignty over their ‘national’ market and there is a 
                                                 
23 Directive 70/50/EEC on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions 
on imports and are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty, [1970] OJ L 13/29 
24 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
25 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 
649. 
26 See, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 
649, paras. 8-11 and 14-15. On the distinction between the broad and narrow approach in defining an “obstacle to 
trade”, see I. Lianos, ‘Shifting Narratives in the European Internal Market: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the 
Nature of ‘‘Economic” Integration’, (2010) 21(5) EBLRev 705- 760; I. Lianos, In Memoriam Keck: The 
Reformation of the EU Law on the Free Movement of Goods, (2015) 40(2) European Law Review 225-248. 
27 Mutual recognition is not therefore equivalent a country of origin rule, which requires higher degrees of trust 
in the regulatory system of the country of origin. 
28 R. Schütze, From International to Federal Market – The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP, 2017), 
126 refers to the “international law loyalty” of the first decade of interpreting the provisions of the Treaty 
regarding MEQR. 
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transition from host State regulatory control to home State control”, as “(h)ost States no longer 
may regulate imports that have already been regulated by the home State”29. This tectonic 
change also may mark a “shift from positive to negative integration” as the main tool for 
promoting economic integration in the EU30. According to the same authors, the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU briefly has approached the “national” market model, when it expanded the logic 
of mutual recognition to cover both product requirements and selling arrangements. This led it 
to include in the definition of an “obstacle to trade” all forms of trade restrictions resulting 
from regulatory diversity31. One should expect the law of one price to apply in a “national” 
market, to the extent that there are no disparities regarding the enforcement of the national 
legislation, there are no differential costs, and consequently any price differential would have, 
in principle, led to arbitrage. However, cheaper imported products lose their competitive 
advantage when they are subject to the regulatory costs resulting from the regulation of the 
host-State at the point of sale. The consumers of the host-State may therefore suffer a welfare 
loss from not being able to purchase cheaper imported products. The volumes of trade are also 
reduced, as there exist less commercial opportunities of arbitrage.  
The main difficulty with this conceptualization of economic integration is that any 
additional regulatory costs the host State imposes on imported products may be found to 
constitute an obstacle to intra-EU trade. Hence, the framework does not easily accommodate 
the need for regulatory pluralism when this results from the democratic choice of a specific 
polity to adopt certain standards representing different regulatory values and/or the different 
tastes in public goods of its citizens. This was the underlying reason the CJEU abandoned this 
expansive view of Article 34 TFEU in Keck32, a judgment widely commented by the 
literature33. Keck reversed the burden of proof for selling arrangements, with regard to the 
                                                 
29 R. Schütze, From International to Federal Market – The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP, 2017), 
5-6. Schütze distinguishes three “ideal types” of economic coordination/integration: (i) the “modern international” 
market model which is based on host-State regulatory control and which prohibits discrimination, determined in 
comparison with the regime applied to the products of the host-State, although this is not interpreted broadly so 
as to cover “discrimination flowing from a diversity of national regulations”; (ii) the “federal” market model, 
which is based on the principle of mutual recognition and “examines whether the extension of host State laws to 
imports imposes a ‘restriction’ or ‘obstacle’ to intra-Union trade, and thus does not only focus on discrimination 
against imports by the host-State, and (iii) “national” market model, where “all trade restrictions that are above a 
– legislative or judicial – Union standard must be removed” and thus also covers obstacles to trade resulting from 
disparities between different national legislations, the important element to consider being if the host-State law 
“reduces the volume of trade within the internal market disproportionately”.  
30 Ibid., 126. 
31 As this was exemplified by the “Sunday Trading “case law of the CJEU: For an analysis see, C. Barnard, 
‘Sunday Trading: a Drama in Five Acts’, (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 449. 
32 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard 
(hereinafter Keck) [1993] ECR I-6097. 
33 See, See, among others, L. Azoulai (eds), L’entrave dans le droit du marché interieur (Bruylant: Brussels, 
2011); C. Barnard, ‘Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?’, (2009) 68(3) Cambridge L J 575; 
G. Davies, ‘Understanding market access: exploring the economic rationality of different conceptions of free 
movement law’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal, 671-704; D. Doukas, ‘Untying the Market Access Knot : 
Advertising Restrictions and the Free Movement of Goods and Services’, (2006-2007) 9 CYELS 177; P. 
Eeckhout, ‘Recent Case Law on Free Movement of Goods: Refining Keck and Mithouard’, (1998) EBLRev 267; 
A. Fromont & C. Verdure, ‘La consécration du critère de l’"accès au marché" en matière de libre circulation des 
marchandises : mythe ou réalité?’, (2011) 47 (4) Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 717-748 L. Gormley, 
Inconsistencies and Misconceptions in the Free Movement of Goods’ (2015) 40 European Law Review  925; T. 
Horsley, ‘Unearthing Buried Treasure: Article 34 TFEU and the Exclusionary Rules’ (2012) 37 (6) ELRev, 734-
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evidence of the existence of an “obstacle to trade”. The prohibition stated in Article 34 TFEU 
may apply only if the plaintiffs have already provided evidence that the rules in question are 
likely to have a discriminatory impact (in law or in fact) on the market access of the imported 
goods. The prohibition of “discrimination in fact” precludes any measure that would be “by 
nature such as to prevent [the imported goods’] access to the market or to impede access any 
more than it impedes the access of domestic products”34.  
As I have explained elsewhere35, the discriminatory market access approach chosen by the 
CJEU in Keck requires a comparison of the burdens imposed pre-commercialisation to the 
domestic and imported products. The inquiry focuses on the competitive relationship between 
the imported and the domestic products, which should not be ultimately altered by the national 
measure. Traders should enjoy equal opportunities in taking advantage of price differences and 
in performing their arbitrage function, to the extent that these price differences do not reflect 
differences about the social costs of the specific economic transaction (e.g. the sale and 
consumption of a specific product). It is possible that the price differential results from 
disparities in the regulation of the commercialisation of a product between home and host-
States, because the host-State considers that commercialising this product, domestic or 
imported, generates social costs. The contribution of Keck was that the host-State should not 
be required to substantiate the reasons and calculations that led it to believe that the specific 
product generates social costs, if the regulation does not make any formal distinction between 
imported and domestic products and it is not expected that it will have a discriminatory impact 
or will eventually prevent the market access of the imported product. In the absence of such 
prima facie evidence of discrimination in law or in fact, which is to be brought by the trader, it 
makes sense to consider that this type of regulation of the host-State will be deemed compatible 
with Article 34 TFEU. In the statistical parlance, this presumption aims to avoid type 1 errors 
or false positives (e.g. a non-discriminatory and non-protectionist regulation aiming to preserve 
a public interest in a proportional way which will be found to infringe Article 34 TFEU). One 
may also interpret this case law as showing that, for the CJEU, the cost of false positives 
outweighed in this case that of false negatives (e.g. discriminatory or protectionist regulation 
that was found to be legal).  
                                                 
757; R. Kovar, ‘Dassonville, Keck et les autres : de la mesure avant toute chose’, (2006) 42(2) Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Européen (RTDE) 213 ; P. Koutrakos, ‘On Groceries, Alcohol and Olive Oil : More on the Free 
Movement of Goods after Keck’, (2001) 26 ELRev 391 ; I. Lianos, ‘Shifting Narratives in the European Internal 
Market: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the Nature of ‘‘Economic” Integration’, (2010) 21(5) EBLRev 705; I. 
Lianos, In Memoriam Keck: The Reformation of the EU Law on the Free Movement of Goods, (2015) 40(2) 
European Law Review 225; P. Oliver, ‘Of trailers and jet skis : is the case law on Article 34 TFEU hurtling in a 
new direction?’, (2010) 33(5) Fordham International Law Journal, 1423-1471; N.N. Shuibhne, ‘The free 
movement of goods and Article 28 EC : an evolving framework’, (2002) 27 (4) ELRev, 408-425; R. Schütze, Of 
Types and Tests: Towards a Unitary Doctrinal Framework for Article 34 TFEU?. (2016) 41(6) European Law 
Review 826; N.N. Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law – Constitutional Responsibility and the 
Court of Justice (OUP, 2013), 234-256; J. Snell, ‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slogan?’, (2010) 
47 CMLRev, 437-472; P. Wennerås & K. Bøe Moen, ‘Selling arrangements, keeping Keck’ (2010) 35 (3) ELRev, 
387-400. 
34 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard 
(hereinafter Keck) [1993] ECR I-6097, para. 17. 
35 I. Lianos, ‘Shifting Narratives in the European Internal Market: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the Nature 
of ‘‘Economic” Integration’, (2010) 21(5) EBLRev 705-760. 
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However, one may also argue that it is more likely that regulations on the composition and 
characteristics of a product affect disproportionately imported, rather than domestic, products. 
State rules on product requirements almost always impose on imported products costs that have 
not been incurred by the domestic products post-entry into the market. The reason is that the 
process of domestic production internalizes the constraints of the specific regulatory context, 
prior to making any business decision over the designation, form, size, weight, composition, 
presentation, labelling or packaging of the product. Imported products do not benefit from such 
internalization of the host state’s regulatory framework, as their natural market is presumably 
that of their country of origin. Hence, it is safe to establish a presumption in this case that such 
regulation restricts the market access of the imported products more than that of domestic 
products.  
It would be for the host-State to reverse such presumption by arguing that its regulation did 
not aim to impose a differential burden or to affect the competitive relation between the 
imported and domestic products, but to raise the price of all products in the host-State market 
to reflect their true social costs (as these are perceived by the host-State regulator), in view of 
their effect on some public interest objective(s). The fact that the increase of the cost and price 
of the imported products caused by the host-State’s regulation was not disproportional denotes 
that the host-State lacked protectionist intent, and that therefore its measure should, in 
principle, escape the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU. Proportionality is assessed in comparison 
to the effect of the regulation on domestic products or based on some principled/abstract 
approach examining the true social costs of their production, as revealed by the broader 
regulatory preferences of the host-State, should there not exist any competing domestic 
production. Further possibilities of justification are provided, even for discriminatory 
measures, by Article 36 TFEU.  
Contrary to what some authors contend36, the Keck approach does not therefore signify a 
return towards a more “international” market approach, but a different and probably a more 
genuine “federal” market vision, to the extent that in federalism one should not always expect 
the transfer of regulatory competences to work only in one direction (from States to the Federal 
State), but actually in both directions (also from the “federal” level to that of the constituent 
States). The trader’s right to take advantage of market/arbitrage opportunities should be 
protected, without however that affecting the regulatory values and public interests pursued by 
the member States, to the extent that the EU has not regulated this area. 
The focus has shifted in the most recent case law of the EU from the impact of the 
differential regulatory regime on traders to that on the effect of the specific measure on 
consumer demand. Examining some national regulations restricting the use of products, the 
CJEU held that a national measure may fall under Article 34 TFEU if it exercises a 
“considerable influence in the behaviour of consumers” of the host State, thus limiting the 
opportunities of a foreign product to access the market of the host State37. This mixed approach, 
combining a discriminatory market access rule focusing on the supply side with an approach 
                                                 
36 See, R. Schütze, From International to Federal Market – The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP, 
2017), 279. 
37 Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italian Republic, [2009] ECR I-519, para 56. For a discussion of this evolution 
see, I. Lianos, In Memoriam Keck: The Reformation of the EU Law on the Free Movement of Goods, (2015) 
40(2) European Law Review 225-248. 
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emphasising the “considerable influence” of the measure “on the behaviour of consumers” at 
the demand side, may eventually bring under the scope of Article 34 TFEU simple disparities 
in the regulatory conditions prevailing in each market. Indeed, if the host-State’s regulation 
leads to significant price differentials for imported products, and imposes higher costs, as 
compared to domestic products, this may potentially exercise a “considerable” influence on 
consumer demand, and therefore may affect the “market access” of the imported product. 
Although this case law does not mark the transition towards a national market model, as 
incorporating the law of one price, it is certainly less accommodating for regulatory pluralism 
than the Keck approach, at least in situations where the host-State’s regulation considerably 
affects consumer demand. Focusing on consumers may also have interesting implications, in 
particular when assessing the compatibility with EU law of private restraints of trade, which 
are not directly targeted by Article 34 TFEU38, but may be targeted by other provisions of the 
EU treaties, such as competition law. Moving from a broader to a narrower definition of 
obstacles to trade and then again to a slightly broader one follows in a federal system that 
frequently might re-allocate competences between the centre and the periphery. 
The various models put forward by the literature when coding the voluminous case law on 
free movement of goods, are certainly useful in understanding the broader narratives in 
operation. However, they offer a limited explanation to what would seem to be rather frequent 
changes of direction, and at different levels with regard to the policy space of the periphery 
versus the centre, since they do not take into account all the complexities of the legal construct 
of the Internal Market. The theoretical framework for the free movement of goods was partly 
transposed to other freedoms. However, there is some divergence in the interpretation of the 
concept of “obstacle to trade”, or of the personal and material scopes of the EU free movement 
provisions. This has led some authors to talk of “several Internal Markets”39, rather than a 
“single Market”. Hence, the above analysis is meant only as an illustration of the quite complex 
interaction between Member State’s regulatory autonomy and the EU economic integration 
legal compass. 
The co-existence of various principles, some moving closer, and some moving further from 
the law of one price and the idea of a “national” market, makes the effort of developing 
adequate tools to measure the success of the project of EU integration particularly challenging. 
Measuring the success for such a complex project of economic and social integration cannot 
rely on the same measurement tools employed for assessing the operation of the law of one 
price. It cannot also rely on the simple measurement of an increase in the volumes of intra-EU 
trade, as these may result from a higher degree of divergence in the prices of the various factors 
and an incomplete process of factor price equalization. Finally, as the focus gradually shifted 
from constituting a “single market”, in the sense of removing trade barriers, to that of managing 
                                                 
38 See, Case 311/85, ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v ASBL Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke en 
Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten, ECLI:EU:C:1987:418, para. 30 (“Articles [34 and 36 TFEU] concern only public 
measures and not the conduct of undertakings”); Case C-159/00, Sapod Audic v Eco-Emballages SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:343, para. 74 noting that “a contractual provision cannot be regarded as a barrier to trade for 
the purposes of Article [34 TFEU] since it was not imposed by a Member State but agreed between individuals”. 
Hence, the important thing is for the measure to be attributable to a Member State’s action or inaction (on the 
latter, see Case C-265/95, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1997:595). 
39 S. Weatheril, The Several Internal Markets, (2017) Yearbook of European Law, yex007, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/yel/yex007 . 
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regulatory diversity through a process of managed mutual recognition, the concepts of 
regulatory compatibility or regulatory convergence may provide more adequate reference 
points for conceptualizing and measuring the “success” of the EU economic integration project. 
 
III. From economic integration to “regulatory convergence” 
 
It is clear that the concept of “economic integration” has served as a rallying slogan for 
proponents of the constitution of the EU Internal market the first three decades of its existence. 
By the time the Single European Act came into effect in 1987 and following the expiration of 
the December 31, 1992 deadline, the idea of “economic integration” evolved. Its purpose was 
not just to ensure the integration of national markets through “the elimination of all obstacles 
to intra-[Union] trade to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about 
conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market”40, that is an Internal 
market established and regulated by common rules or coordinated standards. The Lisbon Treaty 
added that of constituting “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion”41. This was the first time the economic and social dimensions of integration were 
seen as complements, although for some the social engagement of the EU was clearly not of 
equal importance and, in reality, may have worked against achieving a higher level of social 
protection in the various EU Member States42. This new emphasis on sustainable economic 
growth had nevertheless transformative effects on the conception of “economic integration”. 
This could not be conceived as just aiming to the establishment of a “single” market, akin to 
the constitution of some form of “natural order”43 of an EU-wide market. It was widely 
understood that it had to move simultaneously with some form of coordination, 
Europeanisation or “communitarisation” of the policies dealing with the social question, 
resulting from the necessary compensation of the losers of the expansion of free trade 
principles44. 
 “Policy convergence” could offer an overarching concept to conceptualize the 
governance of the economic and social realms in tandem. Several strategies and mechanisms 
were suggested to achieve this aim, through a mixture of the traditional Community method 
                                                 
40 Case 15/81, Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:135. 
41 Lisbon European Council – Conclusions of the Presidency (March 23-24, 2000), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm . 
42 See, N. Countouris & M. Freedland, The myths and realities of Social Europe, in N. Countouris & M. Freedland 
(eds.), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis (CUP, 2013), 1, at 4-5 (noting that the Lisbon strategy was a 
“Trojan Horse” leading to deregulation of labour markets and high levels of unemployment). 
43 B.E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets (Harvard Univ. press, 2011), Chap. 3 on the birth of the idea of the 
market as a “natural order” and the intellectual linkage of this to the physiocrats and their intellectual offspring, 
the Hayekian tradition of natural law theory, followed by the Chicago school of law and economics. 
44 On the various forms of social regulation coordination and their interaction (sometimes synergetic, sometimes 
competitive) with the traditional EU “community method” see, M. Dawson, New Governance and the 
Transformation of European Law (CUP, 2011); K.A. Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion - Europeanization 
through Policy Coordination (OUP, 2010); V. Hatzopoulos, Why the Open Method of Coordination Is Bad For 
You: A Letter to the EU (2007) 13(3) European Law Journal 309; D. Ashiagbor, The European Employment 
Strategy: Labour Market Regulation and New Governance (OUP, 2005). 
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and new imaginative approaches of convergence or “Europeanization”. These drew on the open 
method of coordination for more politically sensitive issues45, or the constitution of European 
networks of independent regulators for areas considered as being more technocratic46. The EU 
promoted policy convergence over specific performance goals, not just as a way to erode inter-
jurisdictional trade barriers, but also mainly to drive towards more efficient, that is markets-
compatible, policy-making. To the extent that the globalization of economic production 
spearheaded by the IT industrial revolution in the 1990s led to a significant decrease of 
management costs, and the development of global value chains, this quest for “regulatory 
compatibility”47 or regulatory “alignment”48 expanded outside the EU, to also cover the various 
EU trade partners, associated with the EU through accession agreements, association 
agreements, and regional or bilateral trade agreements.  
A similar trend towards “regulatory convergence” may be observed with the trade 
policy followed by a number of other developed economies during the same period, as this 
concept “has emerged as an overarching horizontal discipline in the latest generation of 
preferential trade agreements”49. Policy observers may note the importance of “regulatory 
convergence”, “regulatory compatibility” and “regulatory coherence” in the negotiations for 
the TTIP between the European Commission and the US and other mega-trade agreements50.  
Each of these mega-trade agreements include, in addition to traditional provisions for 
trade agreements such as market access rules, regulatory “behind the border” issues involving 
foreign direct investment, intellectual property rights, labour standards, as well as competition 
rules. These are usually accompanied by horizontal provisions on “regulatory compatibility” 
and “regulatory convergence”51. For instance, the EU/Canada Comprehensive Trade and 
                                                 
45 See, inter alia, K. Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (OUP, 2003);  
46 See, inter alia, G. Majone (ed.) Regulating Europe (Routledge, 1996); M. Thatcher, Regulation after delegation: 
independent regulatory agencies in Europe, (2002) 9 Journal of European Public Policy 954. 
47 Article 21.2(4)(b) of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU. 
48 The concept of regulatory “alignment” appears in Annex II of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU stipulating that “approximation of legislation means […] the 
alignment of the legislation of one or more of the parties to the regional economic integration agreement with the 
legislation of the other Party or Parties to that agreement”. It also appears in the recent Joint report from the 
negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during phase 1 of 
negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the European Union, TF50 
(2017) 19 (December 8th, 2017), para. 49 noting that “(i)n the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom 
will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union”.  
49 For a discussion of the nebulous conceptual boundaries of this concept and of the different mechanisms used to 
achieve regulatory convergence, see R. Polanco Lazo & P. Sauvé, The Treatment of Regulatory Convergence in 
Preferential Trade Agreements, (2017) World Trade Review 1. 
50 Further examples of these “deep” mega-trade agreements, include the EU Korea FTA, the US Korea FTA, the 
EU Singapore FTA. One may also cite the Australia-New Zealand regulatory cooperation and the US-Canada 
Regulatory Cooperation Council. The US-Canada have also put in place the US-Canada Regulatory Cooperation 
Council which was created in 2011 by the US President and the Canadian Prime Minister, thus not resulting from 
an international trade agreement. It aims at better alignment in regulation, enhancing mutual recognition of 
regulatory practices and establishing new effective regulations in specific sectors. It is composed of high-level 
representatives of regulatory oversight bodies as well as senior representatives from the international trade 
departments, but other regulatory agencies are also involved. 
51 S. S. Krstick, Regulatory cooperation to remove non-tariff barriers to trade in products: key challenges and 
opportunities for the Canada-EU comprehensive Trade Agreement (CETA), (2012) 39(1) Legal issues of 
Economic Integration 3-28; B. Hoekman, Fostering Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Gradual 
Multilateralization, (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law 609-624  
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Economic Agreement (CETA) includes “horizontal” regulatory cooperation provisions to 
“prevent and eliminate unnecessary barriers to trade and investment”, “regulatory 
compatibility, recognition of equivalence, and convergence”, including “(b)uilding trust, 
deepening mutual understanding of regulatory governance”, and “reducing unnecessary 
differences in regulation”, among other similar objectives52. Similar provisions have been 
discussed to be included in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that was 
negotiated between the EU and the US. The EU Negotiators Mandate called for “enhanced 
cooperation between regulators” and “regulatory compatibility”53. A Section on Regulatory 
Policy Instruments provided for some harmonization of “analytical tools” such as Impact 
Assessments. The parties envisaged that a bilateral cooperation mechanism would support 
regulatory cooperation with the aim to “seek increased compatibility between their respective 
regulatory frameworks”. This would include information and regulatory exchanges “led by the 
regulators and competent authorities at central level responsible for the regulatory acts 
concerned”. A specific provision on the promotion of “International Regulatory Cooperation” 
stipulated that “the Parties agree to co-operate between themselves, and with third countries, 
with a view to strengthening, developing and promoting the implementation of international 
instruments inter alia by presenting joint initiatives, proposals and approaches in international  
bodies or fora, especially in areas where regulatory exchanges have been initiated or concluded 
pursuant to this Chapter, but also in areas covered by [specific or sectoral provisions –to be 
identified] of this Agreement”. The parties further “reaffirm[ed] their intention to implement 
within their respective domestic systems those international instruments they have contributed 
to, as provided for in those international instruments”54. 
The idea is that once regulatory systems develop some form of “convergence”, the 
reasons for regulatory diversity erode. The convergence can be based, for instance, on a 
common reliance on similar sources of scientific expertise and similar regulatory processes, or 
international cooperation to promote a common interpretation and understanding of that expert 
body of knowledge. Whatever one may think of the view that similar inputs of expert 
knowledge, with some degree of regulatory cooperation and regulatory process convergence, 
will lead to similar regulatory outputs, clearly such an approach aims to kick-start the process 
of inter-state regulatory cooperation to reduce “unnecessary differences” in regulation and 
achieve “regulatory compatibility”.  
It remains however that, as with the narrow view of economic integration, presented in 
the previous Section, the main difficulty with this conceptualization of “policy convergence” 
is that it may not accommodate the need for regulatory pluralism and diversity, which might 
better represent the diverse preferences of the various political communities (in the absence of 
a single political community) connected through the nexus of global markets (and global 
supply chains). By focusing on the demands of specific stakeholders, in particular businesses 
                                                 
52 EU Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) formally proposed by the European 
Commission for adoption by the Council of the EU in July 2016, Chapter 26 on Regulatory Cooperation, available 
at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-
texte/26.aspx?lang=eng . 
53 See the EU proposals on Regulatory Cooperation, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf . 
54 See, https://wikileaks.org/ttip/Regulatory-Cooperation/Regulatory-Cooperation.pdf . 
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eager to expand their activities in global markets, the narrow definition of “policy 
convergence” as the process through which the convergence point of a “natural” market order 
will be achieved may face a similar legitimacy crisis, similar to the crisis the neo-functionalist 
integration model recently has entered. Indeed, institutional choices should not only be judged 
from a welfare perspective, in the sense that a particular institutional equilibrium produces 
superior welfare effects in comparison to another one, but also from a participatory perspective, 
regarding the quality and extent of participation in the decision-making processes at issue by 
the various stakeholders of the community/communities in question55. One needs to account 
for the interests of all parties affected, which of course supposes some form of democratic 
legitimation. The idea that this “policy convergence” may be more the result of the work of a 
technocratic elite, rather than the product of participatory and democratic politics, has been a 
major source of concern and criticism. This led to the “democratic deficit” debate a few decades 
ago56, and more recently to discussions over “The Europe of bankers”, the return of “national 
identity”, and a generalised distrust of the European elites57. 
These discussions notwithstanding, there is a considerable qualitative step in shifting 
attention from managed mutual recognition and defining what constitutes an “obstacle to trade” 
to regulatory convergence. If the former accepts, to a certain extent, disparate regulatory 
burdens, by focusing on the traditional tools of trade law and the interaction of negative and 
positive integration, as well as the existence of a regulatory conflict with regard to the allocation 
of jurisdictional authority between the centre and the constituent units, regulatory convergence 
follows what looks like an incentives mechanism design approach, where the rules of the game 
are set in such a way as to engineer regulatory convergence, and to avoid situations where 
conflict might emerge in the future. This change of approach may be justified by new 
circumstances in the way economic production and commercialisation are structured at a global 
scale. 
 
IV. The changing face of economic integration: global value chains and economic 
“integration through code” 
 
Discussions over economic integration have always focused on the role of regulatory 
barriers to trade, from customs duties to non-tariff barriers, the latter being particularly 
                                                 
55 N. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy, (University 
of Chicago Press, 1997).   
56 See, inter alia, K. Featherstone, Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in the European Union, (1994) 32(2) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 149; J.H.H. Weiler, U.R. Haltern & F. Mayer, European Democracy and its 
Critique (1995) 18(3) West European Politics 4; G. Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of 
Standards (1998) 4(1) European Law Journal 5; A. Moravcsik, In Defense of the Democratic Deficit: : reassessing 
the Legitimacy of the European Union, (2002) 40(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 603; A. Follesdal & S. 
Hix, Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik (European Governance 
papers, No. C-05/02, 2005);  
57 For a discussion of the different facets of Euroscepticism, see B. Leruth, N. Startin & S. Usherwood (eds.), The 
Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism (Routledge, 2017); J. FitzGibbon, B. Leruth & N. Startin (eds.), 
Euroscepticism as a Trans-National and European Phenomenon (Routledge/UECAS, 2016); H. Best, G. Lengyel, 
L. Verzichelli, The Europe of Elites - A Study Into the Europeanness of Europe's Political and Economic Elites 
(OUP, 2012); C. Leconte, Understanding Euroscepticism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); A. Szczerbiak & P. 
Taggart (eds.), Opposing Europe? – The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (OUP, 2008). 
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damaging for the free flow of commerce in an integrated economy. However, this 
conceptualization of economic integration looks parochial in the era of the globalized 
production system driven by the important technological changes in ICT during the last twenty 
years and the emergence of a new kind of global infrastructure technology, the cyberspace. As 
sociologist Manuel Castells remarks, this economy should not be characterized as international 
but as being global in nature, with cyberspace acting as “a historically new reality, distinct from 
a world economy”. Indeed, “a world economy, that is an economy in which capital 
accumulation proceeds throughout the world, has existed in the West at least since the sixteenth 
century […] A global economy is something different: it is an economy with the capacity to 
work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale”58.  
This raises the question of what could be the role and value of economic integration 
within a European “single” market in the context of a “global economy” marked by the 
important role of global value chains in regulating trade flows, and more generally the 
circulation of factors of production, globally as well as in the EU. Furthermore, one may 
speculate on the distinguishing element characterizing the European Internal market project as 
a different (qualitative) step in the process of economic integration. To answer these questions 
one needs to explore the profound transformations of modern international trade, in view of 
the development of global value chains as the most influential institution for the governance of 
international trade flows, and to examine the continuing relevance of the traditional concept of 
comparative advantage, which has served as the bedrock of the global and regional projects of 
economic integration, including the EU Internal Market project. 
This new perspective will assist us in conceptualizing the EU Internal Market project, 
not just as a process of economic integration through the removal of public barriers to trade, 
but as a regulatory compass that combines traditional tools of negative economic integration, 
such as the prohibition of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, and positive integration, but 
which also includes other instruments having an integrative potential, such as competition law 
and regulation, or tools of “smart” or complex economic integration that proactively aim to 
take full advantage of the most powerful and self-reiterated integrative force of the modern 
economy, the cyberspace. 
 
A. Comparative advantage and global value chains: the transformation of 
international trade 
 
The development of IT and in particular the Internet in the early 1990s led to significant 
changes in the global economic organization of production, with the slicing or “unbundling” 
of the production process in various discrete tasks or phases through the establishment of 
modular production networks59, and its vertical outsourcing in off-shore production facilities 
                                                 
58 M. Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture – The Rise of the Network Society (Wiley, 
1996) , 92 
59 T. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks. A New American Model of Industrial Organization, (2002) 11(3) 
Industrial and Corporate Change 451, noting that GVCs rely on codified inter‐ firm links with the “generic 
manufacturing capacity” residing in “turn‐ key” suppliers. 
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managed by Global Value Chains (or GVCs)60. The value chains include a full range of 
activities and processes that are needed to bring a product from conception through the 
intermediary stage of production to delivery to final consumers and final disposal after use61. 
The process starts from the research and the design of a product, continues with its production, 
and ends with the retail stage. These input-output operations “take place through coordinated 
chain components that stretch systemically across multiple – from a few to a few thousand – 
firms”62. The structural and geographical diversification of multinational enterprises 
constitutes an important dimension of the development of GVCs, with Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) acting as a catalyst for trade integration. However, GVCs have also provided 
an opportunity to small and medium local undertakings to gain expertise and technical 
capabilities that would enable them to be “plugged into GVCs as domestic suppliers of 
exporters”63, thus indirectly contributing to exports. They may also participate more actively 
in the global production process and technology sharing, to the extent that a lot of productive 
activity is managed across trans-national networks linked by contractual and other non-equity 
external arrangements and ties. A recent joint OECD, WTO and World Bank report indicates 
that the size of international trade consisting of intermediate inputs, traded within GVs 
constitutes “(b)etween 30% and 60% of G20 countries’ exports”64. Economic production is 
increasingly structured around GVCs, which enable the simultaneous and coordinated 
transnational production and distribution of a very large array of products that each stage of 
the supply chain must manage effectively, without this involving necessarily vertical 
integration by ownership. Some authors go as far as arguing that “(t)he most important 
paradigm for understanding the global economy, and the political and social relationships that 
both guide it and stem from it, is no longer the template of the market but rather the role of 
global value chains”, or corporate action, in the form of global value chains not only driving 
but also defining, and therefore creating, the market65. 
There are various reasons explaining this recent phenomenon. The development of 
technology has made supply chain management more effective and less expensive, enabling 
companies to achieve higher quality at a lower production cost by focusing on “core 
competencies” and outsourcing any “noncore” business functions. This was achieved by the 
unbundling of the production process in various steps, some of which could be transferred off-
shore, according to the comparative advantage provided by the specific off-shore jurisdiction 
                                                 
60 OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD, Implications of Global Value Chains for Trade, Investment, Development (2013); 
UNCTAD, Global Value Chains and Development, UNCTAD/DIAE/2013/1 (2013); OECD, WTO and World 
Bank Group, Global Value Chains: Challenges, Opportunities and Implications for Policy (July 2014); OECD, 
The Future of Global Value Chains – Business as Usual or a New Normal? 0OECD, Policy Papers, No. 41, July 
2017). 
61 R. Kaplinsky & M. Morris, A Handbook for Value Chain Research (Institute of Development Studies, 2002). 
62 K. Sobel-Read, ‘Global value Chains: A Framework for Analysis’ (2014) 5(3) Transnational Legal Theory 364, 
364. 
63 OECD & UNCTAD, Inclusive Global Value Chains (2015), 7-8. 
64 OECD, WTO and World Bank group, Global Value Chains; Challenges, Opportunities and Implications for 
Policy (2014), <https://www.oecd.org/tad/gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf> accessed 6 March 2017, 13. See also 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013, <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf> accessed 
6 March 2017. 
65 Ibid, 367. 
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(i.e. low wages, specialised staff with important technological and research capabilities, or 
excellent infrastructure)66. With the development of ICT and logistics, firms were able to 
coordinate their production activity globally and take advantage of the best combination of the 
comparative advantage of each State in which some tasks of the production activity were 
transferred. The constitution of these international production networks is driven by the value 
added that the exploitation of these various comparative advantages confers to the lead firm 
managing the GVC. Comparative advantage becomes therefore “de-nationalized”67.  
One may also trace the development of value chains in the expansion of national and 
international regulations regarding consumer protection, food safety and quality, and technical 
standardisation. Firms find it crucial to enter into long-term agreements with partners in other 
segments of a value chain, to create the necessary relation of trust that is required by the 
importance of relation-specific investments that need to be undertaken in setting the supply 
chain management. This may lead to disintermediation and vertical integration but also to de-
concentration through the constitution of networks or supply alliances that are managed by 
supply chain councils. Finally, the process of concentration of the retail sector has led to the 
development of powerful buyers (retailers or branded manufacturers) that rely on a complex 
web of suppliers and service providers of all kinds, which are situated in multiple locations. 
These various forms of supply chain management share the common characteristic that 
they are all ultimately (intermediary and final) consumer-orientated, as any segment of the 
chain directs its efforts towards meeting the needs of the next chain ring, the perception being 
that all segments of the chain do not constitute separate islands of activity but essential 
ingredients for the formation of the total surplus value of the chain. For instance, brand-
building takes the wider perspective, that of the whole value chain, leading to the elaboration 
of labels and standards to which the various segments of the chain abide.  
How could this affect economic integration and trade policy? First, this may alter the 
utility function of States, as these aim to promote policies ensuring that their firms participate 
in these global value chains and are thus able to share a significant part of the surplus value 
brought by the chain. Second, it increases the costs for trade of regulatory disparities. The most 
obvious implication of GVCs relates to their transnational dimension, which calls for a 
“transnational coordination” between various firms established in the “host” and the “home” 
States at various levels: products may often be exported from the home State and then 
reimported again to the home-State, after they have incurred one or more rounds of 
transformation in several host States, or they may end up in other host-States. Hence, an 
important characteristic of GVCs is that goods and services increasingly cross international 
borders multiple times as they become finished products.  
“Old” trade law assumed that competition was taking place between States, aiming to 
attract through the development of their comparative advantage products or industries that were 
                                                 
66 R. Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Harvard Univ. Press, 
2016) 156 (noting that this “second unbundling” allowed globalization to reach much deeper into national 
economies and in particular the production function). The “first unbundling” refers to the process of the increased 
possibilities of the mass consumption of products produced in other countries because of low transport costs and 
technological advances in transportation. 
67 R. Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Harvard Univ. Press, 
2016) 12. 
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primarily produced in each State and which were following a strategy of specialisation in the 
industries or products for which they held the comparative advantage. Tariffs and regulations 
that had a protectionist purpose typically were discriminating against imported products (or 
industries) and/or providing some favourable treatment to domestic products (or industries). 
The distinction between domestic and foreign products constituted the foundation of the 
approach put forward by the European Commission regarding non-tariff barriers to trade in the 
early 1970s68, which ultimately led to the development of the various tests of the case law of 
the EU courts on the application of the free movement provisions of the treaties69.  
In contrast, a GVC-inspired trade law should take into account the unbundling and the 
fragmentation of the productive activity in various inputs or steps, which may take place in 
several countries, and of the ability of firms to exploit the comparative advantage of each 
country for the specific task to be accomplished. It is therefore possible that a State may have 
a high participation in GVCs without necessarily this occurring at the last segment of the value 
chain. This does not mean that the net domestic value added created by trade for this State will 
be limited70. It all depends on the value added of the unbundled productive activities taking 
place at the specific State. They may rise to high added value activities pertaining to research 
and development services, such as basic and applied research and experimental development 
of new products and processes, professional services, such as legal and accounting, 
management consulting services, technical business services, or information and 
communication technology services, in which case the share of the surplus value will be 
significant. In other circumstances, the unbundled productive activities may contribute a lower 
added value, in which case the specific State would need to expand their productive capacity 
and the size of their market (domestic and foreign through forward linkages).  
This breaks with the focus of current trade law, at the WTO, as well as at the EU Internal 
Market levels on comparative advantage as expressed in terms of products/industries assuming 
that the GVC attributes the full commercial value of a product to the last country of export, and 
assuming that products are made and exported either fully or primarily by one country. A GVC-
inspired trade analysis will shift the focus to (i) the value added of activities and tasks 
performed at each level of the production chain, (ii) the measurement of the participation of a 
country in GVCs and (iii) the estimation of the distribution of gains between countries in terms 
of countries' shares in total value added created by trade under GVC. This approach also breaks 
with the distinction between products and services, which seems outdated in a world marked 
by the shift towards a “servitization” of manufacturing71, as well as the future development of 
user-based manufacturing (or cloud-manufacturing) and 3-D printing. 
                                                 
68 Directive 70/50/EEC on the abolition of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions 
on imports and are not covered by other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty, [1970] OJ L 13/29 
distinguished between discriminatory and indistinctly applicable measures (to a product or industry). 
69 The distinction between indistinctly applicable measures and discriminatory measures has been the only two 
substantive law categories used by the jurisprudence of the CJEU on what is now Article 34 TFEU, at least until 
it added in in Keck the dichotomy between measures relating to product requirements and selling arrangements. 
70 Value-added is defined as value of output minus value of inputs. 
71 See, inter alia, T.S. Baines, H.W. Lightfoot, O. Benedettini & J.M. Kay, The servitization of manufacturing: 
A review of literature and reflection on future challenges, (2009) 20(5) Journal of Manufacturing 
Technology Management 547. 
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Participation in GVCs may take place either through “forward linkages”, “where the 
country provides inputs into exports of other countries” and the domestic value added is 
contained in inputs sent to third countries for further processing and export through the value 
chain, or through “backward linkages”, “where the country imports intermediate products to 
be used in its exports”72 (see Table 1). The share of a country in total value-added created by 
forward and backward linkages in GVCs may provide a measure of the extent of a country’s 
participation and its relative gains in GVCs73. Just focusing on exports may misrepresent the 
level of participation of the country to GVCs and the exact distribution of gains resulting out 
of their participation to GVCs. Indeed, exports may be decomposed into domestic and foreign 
value-added contents. The domestic value added content of exports may take different forms: 
(i) it may form part of the final or intermediate products directly consumed by the consumers 
of the home country A, (ii) it may be contained in intermediary products exported to host 
country B, which then re-exports them to host country C after these have been 
embodied/integrated as inputs in other products, and (iii) it may relate to the exported 
intermediary products or inputs that are re-imported in the home country A, and then used to 
produce other intermediary products before being exported to a host country B. 
 
Table 1: Value added components of gross exports and GVC trade flows74 
 
 
                                                 
72 R. Banga, Measuring Value in Global Value Chains (UNCTAD, Background Paper, No. RVC-8, 2013), 14. 
73 Ibid. 
74 OECD, see https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/Explanatory_Notes_e.pdf . 
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These value chains are governed by leading firms, in most cases transnational 
corporations (TNCs), which now account for 80 per cent of global trade75. Economic actors 
may maintain or improve (“upgrade”) their position in global value chains. “Economic 
upgrading” is defined as “the process by which economic actors—firms and workers— move 
from low-value to relatively high-value activities in GVC”76. States may also develop various 
trade policies with the objective of “upgrading”, by shifting the composition of their exports 
towards processing industries requiring higher imported content, or by increasing their 
productive capacity to increase their share in the tasks and activities that are part of existing 
GVCs.  
An important implication of these structural changes of the global economy is that 
multinational corporations and global business networks may constitute a source of more 
significant restrictions of trade than those deriving from purely public barriers to trade. Private 
barriers to trade form part of these companies’ competitive strategies as they aim to expand 
their profit base by increasing their sales in various geographic and product markets (horizontal 
competition), as well as by increasing their share in the total surplus value produced by their 
respective value chains (vertical competition). This profoundly affects trade policy to the extent 
that States should not only focus on the removal of trade barriers, but also on improving 
competition and, more broadly, the contestability of markets to the benefit of their consumers 
and suppliers.  
It becomes also important to ensure that quality certification, technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures are non-discriminatory, and that they also do 
not create unnecessary barriers to trade that may affect the efficient operation of global value 
chains. Economic transactions within GVCs when they involve multinational firms and their 
affiliates, or when they take place between firms and their independent suppliers, involve 
multiple crossing of borders, so that the products may be subject to various rounds of industrial 
transformation that exacerbate the costs of trade barriers. Producing according to world 
standards becomes essential for a firm to be able to integrate into a global value chain to the 
extent that different standards and other non-tariff measures may influence trade flows and thus 
block the efficient operation of the GVC77. This may bring within the scope of negative 
integration tools non-tariff barriers that do not just have a protectionist intent”, but which 
“nevertheless can have impact on trade costs” or produce trade frictions resulting from 
differences in regulations, and their implementation78. Emphasis is clearly put on the need to 
ensure the “efficiency” of the value chain, rather than on catering to the preferences of the 
citizens and consumers of the regulating State for specific public interest standards. However, 
it is also recognized that a “reduction to zero” of these non-tariff barriers may not be a “feasible 
option” and that a “certain amount of trade costs related to those measures will always exist”79. 
One should rather focus on the trade costs that are actually “reducible”80. There is a conceptual 
                                                 
75 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey & T. Sturgeon, The Governance of Global Value Chains, (2005) 12(1) Review of 
International Political Economy 78. 
76 G. Gereffi, Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world, (2014) 21(1) Review of International 
Political Economy 9, 18. 
77 OECD & UNCTAD, Inclusive Global Value Chains (2015), 74. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 75. 
80 Ibid.  
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link here with the idea of regulatory convergence, as such an approach may enable a further 
reduction of trade costs, without nevertheless compromising on the public interest aims valued 
by the specific polity.  
In conclusion, focusing on global value chains may offer an alternative 
conceptualization of the project of economic integration than the law of one price, in that it 
hinges on the establishment of value networks across the Member States of the Union as a 
possible measure of the “success” of the European project of economic integration, a 
perspective that would provide more weight to enable participation of firms of all the Member 
States of the Union in Europe-wide value chains81. This conceptualization could be 
complementary to the more consumer-focused logic of the law of one price82. 
The process of the integration of the EU Internal market may therefore be rethought as 
relying on a complex array of wide-ranging policies facilitating GVCs participation. These do 
not only depend on the traditional trade policy tools, but also take into account all internal and 
external factors that may impact on the ability of firms to participate in GVCs (access to ICT 
networks, access to finance, EU-wide and international standards of quality and product 
certification, connectivity and trade facilitation measures). Such a holistic approach to 
economic integration questions the need for different regimes for goods and services, includes 
into the broader picture the interests of traders, consumers and investors, and raises doubts as 
to the need for a strict separation between the rules applying to public and those applying to 
private obstacles to trade.  
It remains to be seen if the case law of the EU Courts will implement this shift of focus 
from market access to access to value chains, and what subsequent adjustments would have to 
occur in the jurisprudence of the CJEU on the free movement of goods. There are, however, 
increasing signs that the EU courts takes a more aggressive stance towards restrictions on 
exports, that may set important challenges for the organisation of EU-wide value chains83. The 
case law also shows greater concern for promoting the ability of economic operators to gain 
direct access to the market through Internet distribution of their products84, and considers 
restrictions to price competition between economic operators situated in different Member 
States, as constituting a MEQR, to the extent that they have a greater impact on the sale of 
products by foreign economic operators than on the sale of the same products by domestic 
economic operators established within the national territory85. The focus on value chains should 
                                                 
81 Such an approach may draw inspiration by the “cybernetic approach” of K.W. Deutsch, who envisioned 
integration as a community of amalgamated or pluralist type with the development of communication channels in 
order to create interdependence between peoples. GVCs may constitute a form of communication channel: K. W. 
Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Utah: Global Pub. Company, 2006, first published 
1954). 
82 See, J. Amador, R. Cappariello & R. Stehrer, Global value chains: A view from the euro Area (2013) cited by 
F. di Mauro, H. Plamper & R. Stehrer, Global value Chains: A case for Europe to Cheer Up, COMPNET Policy 
Brief 03/2013 (ECB, 2013) 4, noting that the foreign value-added in exports – while increasing as a share of 
exports – “was to a major extent sourced from other euro area countries”. 
83 Case C-15/15, New Valmar BVBA v. Global Pharmacies Partner Health Srl, ECLI:EU:C:2016:464. 
84 Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v 0800 DocMorris NV and Jacques Waterval, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:664. 
85 Case C-148/15, Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung eV κατά Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs 
eV, ECLI:EU:C:2016:776 (with regard to a system of fixed sales prices imposed to pharmacies for prescription-
only medicinal products that limit price competition). 
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also provide arguments to maintain the essence of the Keck approach, which seems to have 
made an unremarkable come-back86, as restrictions on selling arrangements to final consumers 
may be judged less problematic for the organisation of supply chains across the EU, than 
restrictions affecting the composition and the characteristics of the product. 
 
B. The “single digital market” agenda: “smart” economic integration through 
technology, regulation and competition law 
 
The “single digital market” agenda constitutes an illustration of the increasing complexity 
of “economic integration” and the way this may be enhanced through a “smart” interaction of 
different policies (and technology), including competition law and regulation.  
 
1.The Digital Single Market Strategy, Geo-Blocking and Geo-Filtering 
 
In his 2014 Political Guidelines for the next European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
President of the Commission, put forward the need to create a connected digital single market 
as one of the new Commission’s priorities87. Indeed, Europe is lagging behind the U.S. and 
China with regard to the development of large digital companies, as this is illustrated by the 
very few unicorns (start-up companies valued more than $1 billion) established in Europe, in 
                                                 
86 See, AG Szpunar in Case C-148/15, Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung eV v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV, ECLI:EU:C:2016:394, para. 23, noting that “Keck is still alive”. To the extent that I 
have published a paper a few months earlier at the European Law Review, entitled “In Memoriam Keck”, in which 
I raised questions as to the continuing vitality of the Keck and Mithouard case law [see I. Lianos, In Memoriam 
Keck: The Reformation of the EU Law on the Free Movement of Goods, (2015) 40(2) European Law Review 
225], I can take the AG’s point as a direct answer to the question I raised… Yet, I remark that, as AG Szpunar 
notes, Keck has been sparsely applied and that, in any case the CJEU did not mention Keck at all in its judgment 
in this case. See, however, Case C-198/14, Valev Visnapuu v. Kihlakunnansyyttää, ECLI:EU:C:2015:751, paras 
103-104 (a judgment issued after the publication of my paper), where the CJEU referred to Keck although it found 
that it did not apply in this case and went on applying the Dassonville test. Hence, although may be “still alive”, 
Keck shows limited signs of practical vitality. 
In his Opinion in Case C-148/, AG Szpunar described the rationale of the Keck case law as following: 
“(s)ensitive matters of a non-economic nature which are only marginally linked to free movement as such (and 
which are non-discriminatory should be left to Member States”, noting that such “sensitivity” cannot be identified 
“when the effect of the measure is to limit competition and the market access of foreign economic operators”. It 
is not clear to me what are the criteria AG Szpunar employs in order to distinguish between “sensitive” and non-
sensitive issues of “non-economic nature”. If competition can potentially be limited, and in particular price 
competition, it is quite clear in my mind that the issue in question relates to an economic matter. I am also unable 
to understand why such measure would be, as AG Szpunar argues, “a far cry” from rules on sale at a loss, rules 
prohibiting opening hours/days, such as the Sunday trading cases, or cases on restrictions on advertising. In all 
these cases, the measures in question restrict different parameters of competition (price and quality of service or 
branding). Hence, I do not think that one can easily distinguish these cases from the present case, as AG Szpunar 
contends on this basis. In my view, the issue is about the existence of a discriminatory impact (in law or in fact) 
on the market access of the imported good, which can be unveiled by using the comparative burdens methodology 
and its focus on the competitive relationship between the imported and the domestic product, which should not 
be altered by the national measure that I have put forward in some past publications: see, I. Lianos, ‘Shifting 
Narratives in the European Internal Market: Efficient Restrictions of Trade and the Nature of ‘‘Economic” 
Integration’, (2010) 21(5) EBLRev 705-760; I. Lianos In Memoriam Keck: The Reformation of the EU Law on 
the Free Movement of Goods, (2015) 40(2) European Law Review 225. 
87 Political Guidelines for the next European Commission – A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change (15 July 2014). The establishment of a Connected Digital Single Market was 
listed as priority no 2. 
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comparison to those based in the United States or Asia88. The follow-up process has been rather 
quick. In 2015, the European Commission adopted a Communication setting a Digital Single 
Market Strategy for Europe89. This will be built on three pillars, one of which includes better 
access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe.  
The recent efforts to promote a “digital single market” testify to the continuing relevance of 
the idea of economic integration and of the need to break down “national silos in telecoms 
regulation, in copyright and data protection legislation, in the management of radio waves and 
in the application of competition law”, all of which reduce the “great opportunities offered by 
digital technologies, which know no borders”90. The digital single market aims to allow 
seamless access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across Europe.  
This objective will be achieved through an array of tools:  
 specific EU rules on e-commerce, including a review of the regulation on consumer 
protection cooperation91,  
 the improvement of price transparency and regulatory oversight regarding the 
delivery of parcels cross-border92,  
 regulation on the cross-border portability of online services in the internal market93,  
 a modernised “more European” copyright framework94,  
 a review of the Satellite and Cable directive to facilitate the online cross-border 
distribution of television and radio programmes95,  
                                                 
88 FT, European unicorns remain elusive (June 16th, 2016), available at www.ft.com/cms/s/2/10a73408-2e37-
11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc.html#axzz4JkzP0bRa . Most of the unicorns in Europe are UK-based, which is also the 
Member State that enjoys the highest levels of e-commerce in Europe: European Union Committee, Online 
Platforms and the Digital Single Market, 10th Report of Session 2015-2016, HL Paper 129 (April 2016), Chapter 
8. 
89 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2015) 192 final 6; Commission Staff Working 
Document, Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe - Analysis and Evidence,  COM(2015) 192 final. 
90 J.C. Juncker, Political Guidelines for the next European Commission (July 15th, 2014), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en.pdf . 
91 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, COM(2016) 283 final. 
92 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel delivery 
services, COM(2016) 285 final. 
93 Regulation (EU) 2017/1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on cross-border 
portability of online content services in the internal market [2017] OJ L 168/1. 
94 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of 
copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and 
retransmissions of television and radio programmes, COM(2016) 594 final; Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 593 final; 
Directive 2017/1564 of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain permitted uses of certain works 
and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for the benefit of persons who are blind, visually 
impaired or otherwise print- disabled and amending Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects 
of copyright and related rights in the information society, [2017] OJ L 242/6; Regulation 2017/1563 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the cross-border exchange between the Union and third countries of 
accessible format copies of certain works and other subject matter protected by copyright and related rights for 
the benefit of persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print-disabled, [2017] OJ L 242/1 
95 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on the exercise of 
copyright and related rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and 
retransmissions of television and radio programmes, COM(2016) 594 final. 
25 
 
 harmonizing VAT rules to deal with the complexity of the various VAT systems that 
may apply to EU cross-border transactions96,  
 specific rules prohibiting geo-blocking and geo-filtering that may raise barriers to 
cross-border online activity97.  
The justification of these new EU-wide normative and adjudicatory interventions 
derives from the traditional “market integration” handbook, although it appears more 
consumer-oriented. To this is added a social and macro-economic growth-oriented dimension, 
in view of the important benefits that e-commerce is expected to provide to the relatively low 
levels of economic growth in the EU98. The main text of the Commission explaining the reasons 
for promoting a “Single Digital Market” reads as follows: 
“(a) digital single market means fewer barriers, more opportunities. It means a seamless area 
where people and business can trade, innovate and interact legally, safely, securely, at an 
affordable cost, making their lives easier. It means business able to fully use new 
technologies; and small businesses in particular able to cross the EU with ‘just a click’. This 
could contribute €415 billion per year to our economy and create hundreds of thousands of 
new jobs”99. 
The focus on the digital single market agenda offers a new chance to the process of 
“economic integration”. It is carried forward by capitalizing on the wave of global economic 
integration through technology, the development of the Internet in the mid-1990s, which has 
considerably reduced, inter alia the costs of marketing, and made it easier for firms and 
products to gain access to consumers or suppliers in foreign markets100. Internet and Big Data 
also provide higher price transparency, enabling the comparison of prices across various States 
and increasing possibilities of arbitrage, often exploited by the well-known “heroes” of EU 
trade law, parallel importers and exporters and other intermediaries. The medium of the Internet 
and the opportunities it represents for firms to organize EU-wide and global-wide value chains 
in sectors that were until recently considered as part of the non-tradable economy, such as retail 
or some professional services (e.g. taxi transport), is also significant. This economic evolution 
                                                 
96 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards harmonising and simplifying 
certain rules in the value added tax system and introducing the definitive system for the taxation of trade between 
Member States, COM(2017) 569 final; Proposal for a Council implementing legislation amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards certain exemptions for intra-Community transactions, COM(2017) 568 
final; Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the certified taxable 
person, COM(2017) 567 final. This e-commerce package was adopted without discussion at the meeting of the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 5 December 2017 in Brussels, after the European Parliament gave its 
opinion on 30 November 2017: see, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/05/vat-on-
electronic-commerce-new-rules-adopted/# . 
97 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on addressing geo-blocking and other 
forms of discrimination based on customers' nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the 
internal market and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC,   COM(2016) 289 final. 
98 See, Final report on the e-commerce sector inquiry (10 May 2017) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_final_report_en.pdf , para.  
99 European Commission,  A digital single market in Europe (European Commission, 2016), available at 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/01368318-4e3d-11e6-89bd-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en , p 4. 
100 See, J. Meltzer, Supporting the Internet as a Platform for International Trade (Brookings, Global Economy and 
Development, Working paper 69, February 2014), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/02-international-trade-version-2_REVISED.pdf  
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may also change the traditional tools of economic integration: it may not be necessary to reduce 
trade barriers through elaborate and politically risky efforts at detailed harmonization, or 
through a generalised system of mutual recognition, such as that attempted with the 
Bolkenstein Directive on services in the Internal market, which contributed immensely to the 
Eurosceptic sentiment and rhetoric in various regions of the Union101. With the Internet, 
economic integration is, to a certain extent, perhaps more laissez-faire, relying on consumers’ 
and suppliers’ incentives to find the best deal, and the governments’ incentive not to jeopardise 
digital economic growth. 
However, firms also may have the incentive to take advantage of technology to block the 
free flow of commerce. In particular, the European Commission has expressed concerns about 
geo-blocking and geo-filtering practices102. Geo-blocking “refers to practices used for 
commercial reasons by online sellers that result in the denial of access to websites based in 
other Member States”103. Geo-filtering consists of offering different terms and/or conditions 
depending on the location of the user, when situated in a different Member State than that of 
the online provider104. Geo-blocking may occur even if consumers are able to access the 
website, when they are not able to purchase products or services from it, particularly when they 
are re-routed to a local website of the same company with different prices or a different product 
or service. Geo-filtering occurs when “geo-localising practices are used as a result of which 
different prices are automatically applied on the basis of geographic location, for example when 
online car rental customers in one Member State pay more for the identical car rental in a given 
destination than online customers in another Member State”105. More generally, geo-filtering 
also may occur when online providers allow users to access and purchase consumer 
goods/digital content services cross-border, but offer different terms and/or conditions 
depending on the location of the user in a Member State different from that of the provider”106. 
According to the Commission, “(g)eo-blocking is one of several tools used by companies to 
segment markets along national borders (territorial restrictions)”; it is further explained that 
“(b)y limiting consumer opportunities and choice, geo-blocking is a significant cause of 
                                                 
101 Directive 123/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market, [2006] OJ L 376/36. For a discussion of the political tensions arising out of the Directive, see M. 
Dagnis Jensen & P. Nedergaard, From ‘Frankenstein’ to ‘toothless vampire’? Explaining the watering down of 
the Services Directive, (2012) 19(6) Journal of European Public Policy 844; M. Chang, D. Hanf & J. Pelkmans, 
The Services Directive: Trojan Horse or White Knight?, (2010) 32(1) Journal of European Integration 97; K. 
Nicolaides & S.K. Schmidt, Mutual recognition ‘on trial’: the long road to services liberalization, (2007) 14(5) 
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consumer dissatisfaction and of fragmentation of the Internal Market”107. Geo-blocking or geo-
filtering may be applied by various operators: retailers operating an online store, online 
marketplaces and price comparison websites108. 
There is more of course in the Digital Single Market than just reducing barriers to online 
trade. The European Commission has also published a Communication on digital platforms, in 
which it stresses the importance of open and non-discriminatory markets, and acknowledges 
that ‘(a)s online platforms play an increasing role in the economy, the terms of access to online 
platforms can be an important factor for online and offline companies’, and that ‘(f)or SMEs 
and micro-enterprises, some online platforms constitute important, sometimes the main, entry 
points to certain markets and data’109. This sketches an industrial policy-light design, where 
competition law is an instrument to achieve the right framework conditions and the right 
environment to retain, grow and foster the emergence of new online platforms in Europe. 
However, we will focus here on the market integration objective of competition law and how 
this may be achieved by enforcing competition law against the practice of unjustified geo-
blocking.  
 
2. Competition Law 
 
In the context of the Digital Single Market strategy, the Commission launched a sector 
inquiry into e-commerce in the EU, on the basis of Article 17 of Regulation 1/2013110. This 
provision enables the Commission to open investigations into sectors of the economy and into 
types of agreements, if there are some indications that competition may be restricted. Although 
the Commission cannot adopt remedies, it publishes a report, which informs its subsequent 
enforcement action under Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU. The aim of the e-sector inquiry was 
to allow the Commission to gather data on the functioning of e-commerce markets so as to 
identify possible restrictions of competition, in particular with regard to cross-border online 
trade, the Commission’s findings being merely based on surveys of companies present in the 
sector.  
The Commission published its initial findings in March 2016 in relation to geo-
blocking, finding that geo-blocking is applied by the majority of online digital content 
providers and is largely based on contractual restrictions, although it may also be adopted 
through unilateral conduct. The Commission also acknowledged the existence of “technical 
geo-blocking”, which aims to restrict a user's ability to access and use content in a given 
Member State from outside that Member State's territory (access and portability restrictions), 
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which is often used for digital content services111.  Technical geo-blocking may limit the user's 
ability to play previously downloaded content in certain territories, restrict the catalogue of 
content and/or services available to a given user in different territories, and inhibit the ability 
of an existing user to access the service in different territories112. The Commission’s Staff 
Discussion paper makes it clear that limiting the ability of European users to shop online cross 
borders, “may run counter to the objective of establishing a single market”113.  
There are a number of examples in more “traditional” economic sectors, where 
competition law has applied to deal with these private barriers to trade (as opposed to public 
barriers to trade, which are dealt by the free movement of goods/services law)114. Article 101 
TFEU targets agreements or concerted practices that are aimed at partitioning national markets 
according to national borders, or more generally at making the interpenetration of national 
markets more difficult115, eventually by restoring the divisions between national markets. 
These are “liable to frustrate the Treaty’s objective” of achieving market integration into a 
“single market”116. Direct restrictions on exports, that is, provisions that oblige a reseller to sell 
only to customers in its contractual territory or prohibit them from selling to customers in other 
Member States outside its territory are considered, by their nature, anticompetitive and 
constitute an infringement of Article 101(1).117 This is also the case for provisions preventing 
the reseller from advertising or offering the contractual good for sale, or establishing 
distribution outlets, in other Member States outside its territory. Territorial restrictions may 
also take the form of differential pricing (including by bonus schemes and discount schemes), 
with which the supplier charges its distributors different prices for the same or equivalent 
products dependent on their destination or place of sale within the EU; product differentiation 
undertaken as part of an agreement118; and restrictions as to the applicability of the 
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manufacturer’s warranty and after-sale services provision, if effectuated by an agreement119, 
although restrictions on warranties may be valid within the context of a selective distribution 
system.120 Only contractual clauses imposing an ‘absolute territorial protection’ are considered 
as restrictive of competition by their nature and anticompetitive by their object.  
The distinction between absolute and relative territorial protection operates as a rule of 
thumb to identify those agreements that are most harmful to consumers. Absolute territorial 
protection leads to a complete elimination of intrabrand competition. It is impossible for any 
retailer established in another territory to resell the contractual goods to consumers established 
in the exclusive territory, either actively or passively (responding to orders by consumers). 
Relative territorial protection preserves some residual level of intrabrand competition on the 
market, as passive sales are still possible. These territorial restrictions, in particular if they are 
absolute, and suppress both active or passive trade, were found to restrict competition by object, 
within Article 101 TFEU, and have been frequently included in the list of hardcore restrictions 
which may not benefit from a block exemption regulation121. Although in principle a supplier 
may prohibit a member of his selective distribution system from operating out of an 
‘unauthorised place of establishment’, in Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique the CJEU did not 
consider a website to be a ‘place of establishment’, therefore finding that such a ban on Internet 
sales by retailers of a selective distribution system constituted a restriction of competition by 
object under Article 101(1) TFEU as well as a hardcore restriction under Article 101(3) 
TFEU122. The scope of this expansive definition of the category of restrictions of competition 
by object that would include bans on Internet sales by retailers in a selective distribution system 
has been examined separately by the CJEU in Coty, where the Court held that suppliers of 
luxury goods can prohibit the members of their selective distribution system from making 
online sales through discernible third-party platforms, to the extent this is appropriate to 
preserve the luxury image of those goods123. The CJEU distinguished between a platform ban 
which is permissible, as it only restricts a specific kind of online sale, and an absolute ban on 
internet sales, which is not permitted124. It is also true that the case law has not always been 
restrictive, as when implementing Article 101 TFEU competition authorities and the courts 
also must consider the legal and economic context of the restriction, which in some cases may 
lead to the conclusion that even an absolute territorial protection may not be liable to impair 
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competition125. It remains to be seen if the future case law will move to expand the importance 
of the legal and economic context. 
Unilateral conduct may also fall under Article 102 TFEU, in case the undertaking in 
question has a dominant position126. The objective of market integration has led to holding that 
nationality-based price discrimination or certain forms of geographical price discrimination 
may be incompatible with Article 102(c) TFEU, which prohibits a dominant undertaking from 
ʻapplying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantageʼ. Discriminations based on nationality are 
absolutely forbidden under EU law and are also explicitly prohibited by Article 18 TFEU. The 
prohibition covers both direct discrimination on nationality and indirect discrimination, based 
on suspicious criteria, such as domicile or the place of establishment. For instance, in GVL, the 
CJEU found that a refusal by a dominant undertaking, in this case a collecting society having 
a de facto monopoly in Germany, to provide services based on the nationality or the residence 
of the client constituted an abuse of a dominant position.127 Indeed, according to the CJEU, the 
collecting society in question conducted its activities in such a way that any foreign artist who 
was not resident in Germany was not in a position to benefit from rights of secondary 
exploitation, even if he could show that he held such rights either because German law was 
applicable or because the law of some other State recognized the same rights. 
Geographic price discrimination may result from the situation of a dominant 
undertaking charging different prices in different Member States. This case law is nevertheless 
less clear than that concerning nationality-based direct or indirect discrimination, as in all cases 
involving geographic price discrimination in the context of Article 102 TFEU, there was 
conduct that supported the market-partitioning effect of price discrimination128. Hence, it was 
not price discrimination per se that was found anti-competitive. 
Of particular interest is the judgment of the General Court (GC) in Tetra Pak II.129 
Among the different practices examined in this case, it was found by the Commission that Tetra 
Pak’s prices for cartons and machines displayed a ʻ wide disparityʼ among Member States. Tetra 
Pak argued that the wide differences were not discriminatory as there was some correlation 
between machine and carton prices, linked to competition on the local market, so that the 
decisive factor was the cost of the system as a whole, this equilibrium between carton and 
machine prices varying from one Member State to another. The price divergences were, 
according to Tetra Pak, due to a complex interaction of historical factors, local market 
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conditions which varied considerably from one State to the other, dairy industry structures, 
local cost considerations, and Tetra Pak's policy of allowing maximum autonomy to its local 
subsidiaries. In contrast, the Commission argued that the differences observed were too great 
to be explained by the objective material differences between the products. The average price 
differences were found to be substantial, from 20 to even 70 per cent. The GC proceeded to 
examine if the price differences found could not be justified by objective economic factors. 
The GC concluded that “the appreciable differences found in the prices of machines and 
cartons occurred in the context of a partitioning of national markets by the tied-sale clauses in 
the contracts”, and “could not be due to normal competitive forces […]”130.  
Hence, non-appreciable differences may not concern the Court, as it did not request a 
uniform price across the EU, but held that appreciable deviations from the law of one price 
could not be tolerated to the extent that the relevant market in this case was the entire EU. 
Indeed, the GC had refuted the specificity of the conditions on local markets, in view of the 
definition of a single geographical market encompassing the entire EU, by virtue, in particular, 
of the marginal role of transport costs. The GC also found that Tetra Pak had an overall strategy 
of partitioning markets, this strategy being inferred from the policies implemented by Tetra 
Pak, certainly as to contracts throughout the EU, and as to communications between the Tetra 
Pak group and its subsidiary Tetra Pak Italiana, which the Commission demonstrated through 
direct documentary evidence. Hence, some evidence of objective intent seemed also to be 
relevant, although not explicitly required by the Court. The General Court confirmed the 
finding of the Commission with regard to the existence of discriminatory pricing contrary to 
Article 102(c). On appeal, the CJEU judgment did not discuss discriminatory pricing.  
 
3. Regulatory and other approaches 
 
Beyond competition law, unilateral conduct may also fall under Article 20(2) of the 
Services Directive, in case there are restrictions based on nationality or place of residence of 
the person receiving the service (or for legal persons their place of establishment or country of 
registration), to the extent that the Directive has been implemented by the Member States, thus 
providing the possibility to challenge the conduct of a service provider. The claimant can be a 
private actor and not just a Member State authority. State action is specifically targeted by 
Article 20(1) of the Services Directive131. In contrast to Article 102 TFEU, Article 20(1) of the 
Services Directive may also apply to the unilateral conduct of service providers even if they do 
not dispose of a dominant position. This provision targets general conditions of access to a 
service that is made available to the public at large, and that relates to rules on prices, payment 
and delivery conditions, rather than rules on terms and conditions that are individually 
negotiated between the trader and the customer. The provision enables the imposition by the 
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service provider of different conditions of access if these are directly justified by objective 
criteria, such as “additional costs incurred because of the distance involved or the technical 
characteristics of the provision of the service, or different market conditions, such as higher or 
lower demand influenced by seasonality, different vacation periods in the Member States and 
pricing by different competitors, or extra risks linked to rules differing from those of the 
Member State of establishment”132. Most Member States made the choice to confer the task of 
administrative enforcement of the national provisions implementing Article 20(2) of the 
Directive to the authorities that had responsibility for administering enforcement of consumer 
protection rules, although some have also entrusted this task to competition authorities.  
In view of the relatively limited implementation of this provision, the Commission 
adopted specific guidance aiming to assist national authorities in its implementation133. The 
Commission’s guidance document on Article 20(1) of the Services Directive notes that few 
complaints of different treatment have led to enforcement decisions by competent authorities 
in the Member States134, and it became soon clear that “Article 20 does not sufficiently address 
discrimination of customers and has not reduced legal uncertainty”135. The Commission’s 
guidance emphasises that the implementation of this provision should focus on “service 
recipients”, rather than service providers, thus indicating the turn of EU Internal Market law 
towards a more consumer-oriented focus. The guidance explains that the elimination of 
regulatory barriers to the provision of services may not be the only problem these consumers 
face, but that they may also experience a refusal to supply or a higher price by undertakings on 
grounds of their residence in another Member State.  
The development of e-commerce, and the significance of the sector for economic 
growth more broadly, had led the Commission to take initiatives in this area, even prior to the 
publication of the Digital Single Market Agenda. The Commission’s concern over geographic 
price discrimination and other conditions that differ across Member States in the EU, was 
initiated by two studies on geographical discrimination against consumers, with a particular 
emphasis on e-commerce, which were commissioned by the Commission and published in 
2009136. The Commission noted in its guidance document on Article 20(1) of the Services 
Directive, that in practice “only a very limited number of the cases brought to the attention of 
these bodies have resulted in administrative or judicial enforcement action at national level”137. 
The document makes clear that for the Commission, “(d)ifferences in treatment are often not 
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established directly on the basis of nationality or residence but rather on proxy factors which 
may end up being tantamount to nationality or residence, such as the country of the driving 
licence, the country of credit card issuance, the place of delivery, the country of origin of 
specifically dedicated IP addresses, the lack of credit history in a particular Member State, the 
lack of registration in the population registry, etc”138.  
A difference in treatment does not, by itself, constitute discrimination, in the event it 
can be objectively justified. The first step in the implementation of this provision will be to 
determine the existence of a difference of treatment. That may consist of different 
characteristics: (i) a refusal to provide access to the service or re-routing the service to a 
subsidiary/point of sale established in the Member State of the service recipient, (ii) price 
discrimination, that is, offering the same service at a different price to consumers in other 
Member States, or (iii) other forms of discrimination, such as offering different terms and 
conditions, such as making different delivery or payment options available to consumers 
resident in other Member States. The analysis becomes more complex for online sales where 
neither the provider nor the recipient move to another territory, as in this case the difference of 
treatment may take the form of a sudden increase in the advertised price at the moment the 
service recipient indicates the country of residence or the place of delivery of the service. The 
Report however explained that “techniques allowing service providers to identify the location 
of the recipient and thus to direct the consumer to the offer adapted to the territory where he is 
resident are not per se indicators of discrimination”139. During the second step, the competent 
authorities will assess whether such a different treatment is objectively justified by performing 
a case-by-case analysis140.  
The Commission puts forward in its guidance document on Article 20(1) of the Services 
Directive various objective justifications141, including a possible divergence in consumer 
protection and contract law rules, to the extent that the EU acquis leaves Member States free 
to adopt more stringent rules. Without moving away from discrimination, the Commission 
appears to express concerns over the existence of a different level of regulatory costs across 
Member States, as costs may be passed on to the consumer and/or may make the economic 
activity less profitable, thus discouraging the service providers from directing their activities 
to other Member States. This may be problematic if the service provider is focusing activity on 
consumers in other Member States. No such concerns are however raised if the service provider 
does not target its service provision abroad and is simply approached by a consumer in another 
Member State wishing to purchase its services142. 
By expanding the geographic scope of markets, the development of e-commerce has 
also multiplied the instances in which customers may face differential treatment by reason of 
their nationality or residence. E-commerce has also made more transparent existing differential 
treatment to consumers. This may not only take the form of unilateral practices but also the 
form of contractual and other arrangements. Referring again to the e-commerce sector inquiry, 
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although the European Commission considered in the Final Report that online price 
transparency and price competition had a significant impact on companies’ distribution 
strategies and consumer behaviour, it castigated the increased use of contractual restrictions 
that could hinder the development of inter-state e-commerce in the EU143. Indeed, according to 
the report, certain licensing practices may make it more difficult for new online business 
models and services to develop across the EU, and consumers in all EU Member States may 
not benefit from a similar level of services and choice.  One of the key findings of the sector 
inquiry was that almost 60% of digital content providers who participated in the inquiry have 
contractually agreed with right holders to “geo-block”, as online rights are to a large extent 
licensed on a national basis or for the territory of a limited number of Member States which 
share a common language. According to the Commission, “(g)eo-blocking is most prevalent in 
agreements for TV series (74 %), films (66 %) and sport events (63 %). It is less prevalent in 
agreements for other digital content categories such as music (57 %), children’s TV (55 %), 
non-fiction TV (51 %) and news (24 %)”144. The Commission stressed that any competition 
enforcement in relation to geo-blocking would have to be based on a case-by-case analysis of 
potential justifications for the restrictions imposed. Another point stressed was the need “to 
avoid diverging interpretations of the EU competition rules regarding business practices in e-
commerce markets which may, in turn, create serious obstacles for companies actively 
competing, in a compliant manner, in multiple Member States, to the detriment of a Digital 
Single Market”145.  
On November 20th, 2017, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
announced that they have reached a political agreement to end unjustified geo-blocking for 
consumers wishing to buy products or services online within the EU146, and to adopt a Geo-
blocking Regulation, using the legal basis of Article 114 TFEU147. The impetus for adopting 
the Regulation derives from a realisation that the implementation of the non-discrimination 
principle in Article 20(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC has proven insufficient to guarantee that 
customers will not confront refusals to sell and various other limiting conditions, when buying 
goods or services across borders.  
The material scope of the Regulation was aligned with that of the Services Directive148. 
Non-economic services of general interest, transport services, audio-visual services, gambling 
activities, retail financial services, healthcare and some other social services are excluded from 
the latter’s scope149. The Regulation prohibits discrimination against customers based, directly 
or indirectly, on the nationality, place of residence or place of establishment of the customer in 
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three specific cases: (a) “where the trader sells  goods, provides services, or seeks to do so, in 
a Member State other than the Member State in which the customer has the place of residence 
or the place of establishment”; (b) “where the trader sells goods, provides services, or seeks to 
do so, in the same Member State as the one in which the customer has the place of residence 
or place of establishment, but the customer is a national of another Member State”; and (c) 
“where the trader sells goods or provides services, or seeks to do so, in a Member State in 
which the customer is temporarily located without residing in that Member State or having the 
place of establishment in that Member State”150. To the extent that there could be conflict 
betweent the rules of the Proposal for a Regulation and the Services Directive in these 
situations, the text of the former will prevail151.  
The Proposal for a Regulation also covers indirect forms of discrimination that could lead 
to similar results as the application of the forbidden criteria of nationality, residence and place 
of establishment, including, for instance, criteria that rely on information indicating the 
physical location of customers (IP address when assessing an online interface, the address 
submitted for the delivery of the goods, the choice of language made or the Member State 
where the customer’s payment instrument has been issued)152. The protection of customers 
from discrimination does not extend to customers purchasing a good or a service for resale, 
and therefore does not apply in a B2B (business-to-business) context, which is subject to 
competiton law rules, in particular for selective and exclusive distribution agreements153. 
The Proposal for a Regulation also establishes an obligation on “traders” not to block or 
limit customers’ access to their online interface, such as websites and apps, for instance through 
the use of technological means, when this is done on the basis of the prohibited criteria of 
nationality, place of residence or place of establishment of the customer154. These technological 
measures include any technologies used to determine the physical location of customers, 
including tracking their IP address, coordinates obtained through a global navigation satellite 
system or data related to a payment transaction155. A similar prohibition applies to the re-
routing of the customer to another online interface, unless the customer has provided consent. 
In any case the trader should keep easily accessible the version of the online interfaces that the 
customer sought to access before having been rerouted156. It is nevertheless made clear that the 
prohibition of discrimination with regard to access to online services “should not be understood 
as creating an obligation for the trader to engage in commercial transactions with customers”, 
as such an interpretation would have seemed disproportional and could have infringed rights 
protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights (in particular the “freedom to conduct a 
business” under Article 16 and the “right to property” under Article 17). Consequently, the 
Proposal for a Regulation provides to traders an exemption from these obligations where the 
access restrictions or the rerouting are necessary, they constitute a mandatory requirement of 
the EU and/or national legislation, and where the trader provides a clear justification157.  
                                                 
150 Article 1(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
151 Article 1(6) of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
152 Recital 5 of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
153 Recital 12 of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
154 Article 3(1) of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
155 Recital 14 of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
156 Article 3(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation 
157 Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
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With regard to the application by traders of different general conditions of access to their 
goods or services, on the basis of the prohibited criteria of nationality, residence and 
establishment of the customer criteria, the Proposal for a Regulation defines three specific 
situations where no justification and no objective criteria are conceivable from the outset: (i) 
the sale of goods without physical delivery, as the customer will be entitled to order the product 
and collect it at the trader's premises or organise delivery himself to his home, (ii) the sale of 
electronically supplied services, the customer having access to the service, and being able to 
register and buy this service without having to pay additional fees compared to a local 
consumer, and (iii) the sale of services provided in a specific physical location without having 
to be redirected to another website158. However, it is also stipulated that “the prohibition 
applicable in those situations should not be understood as precluding traders from directing 
their activities at different Member States or certain groups of customers with targeted offers 
and differing terms and conditions, including through the setting-up of country-specific online 
interfaces”159. Again it is possible for the traders to escape from the discrimination prohibition 
if the differential treatment based on one of the prohibited criteria tracks a specific prohibition 
or requirement recognized by EU law or the law of a Member State following EU law. Rules 
on the pricing of books to protect cultural diversity in the realm of publishing may be cited as 
an example of such mandatory requirements that could be legitimately imposed by the laws of 
the Member States160. 
Specific rules prevent traders from applying different payment conditions on the basis of 
nationality, place of residence or place of establishment of the customer, the location of the 
payment account, the place of establishment of the payment service provider or the place of 
issue of the payment instrument within the Union161. This rule provides that in certain cases 
traders cannot reject or othewise discriminate with regard to payment instruments (such as 
credit or debit cards), although it is also stipulated that traders may request charges for the use 
of a card-based instrument, to the extent the interchanges fees are not regulated. In this case 
the charge should not exceed the costs borne by the trader in using the payment instrument162.  
Finally, circumventing such a ban on discrimination in passive sales agreements is not 
allowed163. The Proposal for a Regulation offers an interesting example of the intersection and 
congruent implementation of the single market rules and those of competition law with the aim 
to promote market integration, as it is explicitly stipulated that the projected Regulation will 
not affect the application of the rules on competition. The Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation provides that restrictions on passive sales to certain customers or to customers in 
certain territories are generally restrictive of competition and cannot normally be exempted164. 
The Proposal for a Regulation moves nevertheless beyond competition law as it recognizes that 
                                                 
158 Article 4(1) of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
159 Recital 17 of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
160 Recital 23 of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
161 Article 5 of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
162 Articles 5(1)(a) and 5(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation 
163 Article 6 of the Proposal for a Regulation. 
164 Commission Regulation No. 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, [2010] OJ L 
102/1. 
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this prohibition on discrimination may apply to agreements that may not be caught by Article 
101 TFEU, but could still disrupt “the proper functioning of the Internal Market” and could be 
used to “circumvent” the provisions of the geo-blocking Regulation. If this proves to be the 
case, the Proposal for a Regulation on geo-blocking deems “automatically void” the relevant 
provisions of such agreements and of other agreements in respect of passive sales requiring the 
trader to act in violation of this Regulation165. However, the Proposal for a Regulation on geo-
blocking does not affect agreements restricting active sales. 
In conclusion, the Regulation does not impose an obligation to sell and does not harmonise 
prices. It focuses on discrimination, access to online interfaces, and non-differential access to 
goods and services where the undertaking cannot objectively justify such actions. This is not 
the first time that the EU legislator has intervened to promote market integration in the sense 
of establishing an EU-wide space for competition between undertakings and the right of EU 
consumers to avoid geographic price discrimination, although one may note that this does not 
go as far as implementing the law of one price, and does not constitute a form of direct price 
regulation, as has occurred for other EU initiatives.  
Regulation 717/2007 (‘Roaming Regulation’), adopted in 2007, capped and reduced prices 
for mobile phone consumers who used their devices abroad in other Member States of the 
EU166. The Regulation was thought as a complement to the electronic communications EU 
regulatory framework adopted in 2002, which had not provided national regulatory authorities 
“with sufficient tools to take effective and decisive action with regard to the pricing of roaming 
services within the [EU]”, thus failing “to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market 
for roaming services”167. Although it initially covered only voice calls, it was later extended to 
text messages (SMS)168 and Internet data169. The abolition of all retail roaming surcharges was 
finally implemented in June 2017 so that European consumers now can “roam-like-at-home” 
(RLAH)170, with an EU-wide regulation of wholesale roaming charges ensuring only that 
operators can recover their costs, including joint and common costs171 
Regulation 2015/751, adopted in 2015 by the European Parliament and the European 
Council, following a proposal by the Commission, introduced a cap on the level of interchange 
fees for card-based payment transactions at 0.2% for debit card payments and 0.3% for credit 
                                                 
165 Recital 26 of the Proposal for a Regulation 
166 Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2007 on roaming on 
public mobile telephone networks within the Community and amending Directive 2002/21/EC, [2007] OJ L 
171/32. 
167 Recital 4 of Regulation (EC) No 717/2007. 
168 Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and 
Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
[2009] L 167/12. 
169 Regulation (EC) No 531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012  on roaming on 
public mobile communications networks within the Union  (recast), [2012] OJ L 172/10. 
170 See, Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying 
down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and 
users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on 
roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union, [2015] OJ L310/1. 
171 Regulation (EU) 2017/920 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 as regards rules for wholesale roaming markets, [2017] OJ L 147/1. 
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card payments (cross-border or national)172. Although market integration was not the only 
rationale for adopting such EU-price regulation, since fairness considerations as to preserving 
consumer welfare were important considerations, it was recognized at recitals 10 and 14 of this 
Regulation that “(i)n addition to a consistent application of the competition rules to interchange 
fees, regulating such fees would improve the functioning of the internal market and contribute 
to reducing transaction costs for consumers”. It is noteworthy that both these Regulations were 
also adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. 
 
4. Interaction with the territorial dimension of IP Rights: geo-blocking and geo-
filtering practices integrated in licensing agreements 
 
This intensive legislative activity is complemented by competition law enforcement activity 
aiming geo-blocking and geo-filtering practices integrated in licensing agreements, which are, 
for the moment, excluded from the scope of the Proposal of a Regulation, as they involve the 
complex balancing between the EU interest for cross-border trade and the ability of the IP 
holder to benefit from the territorially limited scope of its IP right, which is also a principle 
recognized by EU law173. 
With regard to geo-blocking affecting copyrighted works, one may refer to the CJEU 
judgment in FAPL and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, which concerned 
territorial restrictions in media rights licensing and imported satellite decoder cards. In order 
to protect such territorial exclusivity and to prevent the public from receiving broadcasts 
outside the relevant Member State, each broadcaster undertakes, in the licence agreement 
concluded with the FAPL, to encrypt its satellite signal and to transmit the signal, so encrypted, 
by satellite solely to subscribers in the territory which it has been awarded. The license 
agreement therefore prohibited the broadcasters from supplying decoder cards to persons who 
wished to watch their broadcasts outside the Member State for which the licence was granted. 
Certain publicans in the United Kingdom have begun to use foreign decoder cards, issued by a 
Greek broadcaster to subscribers resident in Greece, in order to access Premier League 
matches. The publicans bought a card and a decoder box from a dealer at prices lower than 
those of Sky, the holder of the broadcasting rights in the United Kingdom. The FAPL took the 
view that such activities undermined the exclusivity of the television broadcasting rights and 
the value of those rights, and sought to bring them to an end by means of legal proceedings, 
the national court seized, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, referring to the 
CJEU a number of preliminary questions. The first case (C-403/08) concerned a civil action 
brought by the FAPL against pubs that have screened Premier League matches by using Greek 
decoder cards and against the suppliers of such decoder cards to those pubs. The second case 
(C-429/08) had arisen from criminal proceedings against Karen Murphy, the landlady of a pub 
that screened Premier League matches using a Greek decoder card.  
                                                 
172 Articles 3 & 4 of Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 
on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, [2015] OJ L 123/1. 
173 Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and 
Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-9083. 
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The CJEU applied Article 56 TFEU (on the free movement of services) and competition 
law. With regard to the first set of EU law rules, it held that national legislation which prohibits 
the import, sale or use of foreign decoder cards is contrary to the freedom to provide services 
and cannot be justified either in light of the objective of protecting intellectual property rights 
or by the objective of encouraging the public to attend football stadiums. The Court found that 
payment by the television stations of a premium in order to ensure themselves absolute 
territorial exclusivity goes beyond what is necessary to ensure the right holders appropriate 
remuneration, because such a practice may result in artificial price differences between the 
partitioned national markets. Such partitioning and such an artificial price difference are 
irreconcilable with the fundamental aim of the Treaty, which is completion of the internal 
market.  
The Court also applied the competition law provisions of the Treaty, exploring whether 
licence agreements pursue an anti-competitive object where a programme content provider 
enters into a series of exclusive licences, each for the territory of one or more Member States, 
under which the broadcaster is licensed to broadcast the programme content only within that 
territory (including by satellite), and a contractual obligation is included in each licence 
requiring the broadcaster to prevent its satellite decoder cards which enable reception of the 
licensed programme content from being used outside the licensed territory174. The Court held 
that “(a)n agreement between a producer and a distributor which might tend to restore the 
national divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the Treaty’s 
objective of achieving the integration of national markets through the establishment of a single 
market”, and that the agreement in question “had the same effect as agreements to prevent or 
restrict parallel exports”, to the extent that they led to absolute territorial protection and to “a 
reciprocal compartmentalisation of licensed territories” 175. It is noteworthy that the CJEU did 
not condemn the exclusive licences granted by the FAPL, but only what it regarded as the 
additional obligations on broadcasters not to supply decoding devices with a view to their use 
outside the territory covered by the licence agreement. This was done on the basis that these 
provisions ‘prohibit broadcasters from effecting any cross-border provision of services’, 
‘granted absolute territorial exclusivity’, and eliminated ‘all competition between 
broadcasters’.  
Noting that “conflicting assessments of the fundamental freedoms and competition law are 
to be avoided in principle”, the CJEU examined the possibility for these restrictions to be 
justified under Article 101(3) TFEU176. In particular, the CJEU referred to the proportionality 
test which it applied for the free movement provisions part of the judgment. The Court did not 
accept the objective justifications put forward: that the restrictions had the objective of 
encouraging the public to attend football stadiums (in connection with the prohibition on 
broadcasting football matches in the UK during the Saturday afternoon ‘close period’); and  the 
objective of protecting intellectual property (or similar) rights, by ensuring that rights-holders 
are appropriately remunerated, remarking that these restrictions were not necessary in order to 
ensure appropriate remuneration for the rights-holders, as the rights-holder in this case was 
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remunerated for the broadcasting of the protected subject-matter (in the country of origin). The 
‘premium’ paid by rights-holders for absolute territorial protection was thus not necessary to 
ensure appropriate remuneration for exploitation of the rights, in particular as such absolute 
territorial exclusivity results in the partitioning of national markets and artificial price 
differences between markets, which is irreconcilable with the fundamental aims of the TFEU 
and the remuneration agreed between a rights-holder and broadcaster could be set so as take 
account of the potential audience in other Member States. It remains an open question as to 
how the CJEU’s reasoning in respect of the broadcasting of football matches will be applied to 
other markets where digital rights are often licensed on a territorial basis (for example computer 
software, music, e-books or films made available via the internet, as envisaged by Advocate 
General Kokott in her Opinion in this judgment). It is also noteworthy that in its vertical 
restraints guidelines, the Commission acknowledges that in exceptional circumstances 
hardcore restrictions may be objectively necessary for an agreement of a particular type or 
nature and therefore fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU.177  
In the specific case, the CJEU held however that the publican was still in breach of Article 
3(1) of the Copyright Directive, to the extent that the activity in question was profit-making 
and that the re-transmission in the UK amounted to a transmission to a new public, and 
therefore could not, on this basis, escape a finding of copyright infringement178. Hence, 
broadcasters can rely on their copyright to restrict cross border sales when this is done for profit 
to a new public of potential viewers, which could not have been considered by the authors 
when they authorised the broadcasting of their works179, and they can, in theory, impede 
consumers from having access to online content services when travelling outside their country 
of residence and want to continue to have access to services they have subscribed to (portability 
of online content services)180. This issue has however been dealt with the recent regulation on 
cross-border portability of online content services, which although it does not challenge the 
territoriality of the licenses, it assumes (fictio iuris) that the consumption of the online service 
is taking place in the country of residence of the subscriber (thus applying a country of origin 
principle in this context), with the aim to provide a “(s)eamless access throughout the Union to 
online content services that are lawfully provided to consumers in their Member State of 
residence”181. 
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The Commission has also recently taken enforcement action with regard to copyrighted 
work by opening an investigation of licensing arrangements between Sky UK and six major 
Hollywood film studios which contained restrictions affecting cross-border provision of pay-
TV services.182 A statement of objections was sent to Paramount, Sony, Twentieth Century 
Fox, Disney, NBC Universal, and Warner Bros, as well as Sky UK, alleging that certain of the 
content licensing agreements contained geo-blocking clauses that required Sky UK to block 
access to films to consumers outside the UK and Ireland through its online and satellite pay-
TV services, and that granted absolute territorial exclusivity to Sky UK and eliminated 
competition between broadcasters, which infringed Article 101 TFEU. The Commission 
viewed the clauses requiring Sky UK to block access to films to consumers outside its licensed 
territory of the UK and Ireland, as restricting Sky UK’s ability to accept unsolicited requests 
for its pay-TV services from consumers located in other Member States (passive sales). 
Furthermore, certain other contractual obligations in these film studios’ agreements with Sky 
required them to prohibit or limit other broadcasters than Sky UK from responding to 
unsolicited requests from consumers residing and located inside Sky UK’s licensed territory, 
thus preventing them from making their pay-TV services available in the UK and Ireland, 
which eliminated cross-border competition between pay-TV broadcasters and partitioned the 
Internal Market. The Commission found that such restrictions would constitute a restriction of 
competition by object. In April 2016, Paramount offered commitments to address the 
Commission’s concerns, and the Commission adopted a commitment decision under Article 9 
of Regulation 1/2003, making them binding183. These essentially removed the absolute 
territorial protection and the prohibitions of active and passive sales that had benefitted Sky 
UK. Interestingly, one of the commitments requires Sky UK to abstain from bringing an action 
before a court or tribunal for the violation of the obligation preventing or limiting passive 
and/or active sales in an existing licensing agreement.  
These recent developments show that competition law enforcement activity complements 
the new legislative framework against geo-blocking and other forms of prohibited nationality 
or geographic discrimination, in particular as audio-visual services, including services the main 
feature of which is the provision of access to broadcasts of sports events provided on the basis 
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of exclusive territorial licenses, have been excluded from the scope of the Proposal of a 
Regulation on geo-blocking.184 
 
Conclusion 
 
For a significant period of time, the process of EU economic integration and the EU “single 
market” were the most advanced and successful projects of economic integration worldwide, 
leading the process of re-integration of the global economy that took place in the post-Second 
World War period following its disintegration in the protectionist frenzy of the 1930s and the 
second World War period. Sixty years later, the project of EU economic integration has 
achieved several milestones and is still widely considered as the most advanced economic 
integration experiment among independent nations in modern history, although it no longer is 
the only one. A number of regional economic integration projects have since emerged in 
various parts of the globe, and a new generation of mega-trade agreements, regional or across 
continents185, may drive the process towards deeper economic integration at a global, or partly 
global, scale.  
 The purpose of this paper was to reflect on the theoretical underpinnings of the “single 
market” concept and to explore a possible need for some updating, in view of the significant 
technological and economic transformations the last two decades, related to the emergence of 
a global production process, managed by global value chains and operated with the assistance 
of ICT. I argued that “new globalization186” should be duly considered when examining the 
process of EU economic integration, and the legal concept of the EU Internal market. This may 
lead, with regard to the free movement of goods rules, to the consideration of global value 
chains when defining the contours of what constitutes an “obstacle to trade” infringing Article 
34 TFEU. It may also lead the charge against private restrictions to trade through a more 
systematic use of the competition law instrument or through some form of EU regulation. These 
developments raise more generally the question of the specificity of the EU economic 
integration project, with regard to the ongoing process of global economic integration, a 
question that was not explored in this paper. This may not necessarily relate to the degree of 
economic integration as measured by the law of one price, the interpenetration of an important 
number of firms in regional value chains and networks, or even regulatory convergence, but to 
the mechanisms put in place in order to deal with the social implications arising out of the 
structural transformations of the economy, and the necessary compensation of the “losers” of 
free trade and globalization, a topic that will be examined in a separate paper. 
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